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STEPHANIE R. HOFFER 
Passed on the eve of Medicaid’s fiftieth anniversary, the Achieving a 
Better Live Experience (ABLE) Act was a hard-fought victory for 
individuals with significant disabilities and their families. The law, 
which creates a new form of tax-preferred savings account, represents 
an invaluable work-around for highly restrictive Medicaid eligibility 
requirements. Medicaid eligibility is crucially important for 
individuals with intellectual, developmental, and other significant 
disabilities because it provides nearly exclusive access to government-
coordinated habilitative care, such as in-home assistance, job 
supports, and adaptive equipment. These services are necessary to 
maintain a base-level quality of life, facilitate independent living, and 
preserve the dignity of individuals with disabilities. Despite their 
importance, they are difficult to purchase and coordinate in the 
private market, and due to income and asset holding restrictions on 
eligibility, only the very poor can access them through Medicaid, even 
after passage of the Affordable Care Act. This Article argues that 
despite their facial neutrality, income and asset holding restrictions, 
commonly referred to as means testing, result in undue hardship when 
they are applied to the provision of government-coordinated 
habilitative care for individuals with significant disabilities. 
Congress’s attempts to mitigate this hardship, including the recently 
passed ABLE Act, are important steps forward, but they also can 
impose economic, dignitary, and emotional harms on individuals with 
disabilities. 
 
Based on the distinctive needs of individuals with significant 
disabilities, this Article takes the counterintuitive position that these 
individuals should be afforded access to government-coordinated 
habilitative care through Medicaid without regard to income or 
wealth. Under current market conditions, non-means-tested access to 
habilitative care is a normatively superior solution because it 
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preserves the autonomy and dignity of individuals with disabilities and 
may be simultaneously cost-neutral and utility-increasing. Granting 
unrestricted access to government-coordinated habilitative care to 
individuals with significant disabilities would eliminate perverse 
employment and financial planning incentives created by Congress’s 
past attempts to broaden access. Finally, it would create parity among 
parents who plan for the future of children with disabilities and those 
whose children are typically-abled, as well as parity for retirement 
savings among workers with significant disabilities and those without. 
As a result, Congress should revisit and revise means-tested access to 
disability-related services through Medicaid. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thomas, a healthy and beautiful baby boy, was born in 2015 into an 
upper-middle class family. Within months of his birth, and with the assistance 
of a highly specialized attorney, his parents drafted a trust that, in the event of 
their deaths, would prevent him from ever using family resources to pay for 
food, shelter, or other necessary expenses. Next, the parents contacted their 
insurers, their employers, and their investment advisors to make sure that, in 
the event of their deaths, Baby Thomas would receive no life insurance 
proceeds and no payments from their retirement accounts. These, too, were 
given to the trust. Thomas’s parents did everything in their power to make sure 
that when he reached adulthood, Thomas would be penniless and forced to 
rely on government assistance for his entire adult life. They even included 
language in the trust providing that any expense covered by a government 
program could not be covered by the trust. In other words, because Thomas 
would qualify for government-assisted housing, the trust could not help him 
with rent. Because the government would provide food assistance, the trust 
could not help Thomas with groceries. The trustee was expressly forbidden 
from making support payments to Thomas, and the trust document gave 
absolute discretion to the trustee, who could choose to make no payments at 
all. Stranger still, Thomas’s legal impoverishment and his future reliance on 
public assistance are encouraged by federal law. 
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Why would Thomas’s parents be so perverse, and why would federal law 
sanction their behavior? The answer is that he was born with Down Syndrome. 
Because of his disability, it is likely that Thomas will need assistance, usually 
referred to as “habilitative” care, to live and work in a community setting.1 
Habilitative care typically includes aids to daily living such as personal care, 
homemaking, transportation, and adult day care.2 It also covers case 
management by a social worker and, for individuals who have a regular 
caretaker, respite care to provide the caretaker with a break.3 Habilitative care 
is crucial, particularly to individuals with intellectual and developmental 
disabilities. One study indicated that over 60% of these individuals need help 
with bathing, eating meals, and taking medications.4 Over 70% of them need 
help with finances and home maintenance, and over 80% of them need help 
using transportation.5 Although family members currently provide much of the 
habilitative care needed by individuals with disabilities, they cannot be 
omnipresent.6 Siblings have careers and families; parents age and die. 
Furthermore, habilitative services can be difficult to purchase and coordinate 
in the private market.7 For many, government-coordinated care is absolutely 
essential to maintain quality of life. 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Life After High School, NAT’L DOWN SYNDROME SOC’Y (NDSS) [hereinafter 
NDSS], http://www.ndss.org/Resources/Transition-and-Beyond/Life-After-High-School/  
[http://perma.cc/Z6L8-KDWT] (describing supports needed to transition adults with Down 
Syndrome from high school into adult living). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 THE ARC, STILL IN THE SHADOWS WITH THEIR FUTURE UNCERTAIN: A REPORT ON 
FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS FOR DISABILITY SUPPORTS (FINDS) 6 (June 2011), 
http://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3672 [http://perma.cc/7MML-BS5B]. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. (“Parents, siblings and family members struggle mightily so that their family 
member with I/DD can continue to live at home, or independently, and have a typical life. 
The majority of families report that they provide personal care . . . .”); Sheryl Larson et al., 
Characteristics of and Service Use by Persons with MR/DD Living in Their Own Homes or 
with Family Members: NHIS-D Analysis, MR/DD DATA BRIEF (Research and Training 
Center on Community Living & Institute on Community Living (UAP), Minneapolis, 
Minn.), Apr. 2001, at 11, http://rtc.umn.edu/docs/dddb3-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/TX8A-
XVLG] (finding that while only 20% of adults in the general population live with relatives, 
among those with intellectual or developmental disabilities 60% do). 
 7 See THE ARC, supra note 4, at 7–8 (finding that more than 75% of families report 
that they cannot find reliable care providers, and 80% report that they do not have enough 
money to pay for care that their family member with a disability needs); THE KAISER 
COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 10 (Mar. 2013) 
[hereinafter MEDICAID PRIMER], https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/ 
2010/06/7334-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9UB-YZHC] (reporting that individuals with 
disabilities often are unable to obtain adequate private coverage, and Medicaid allows them 
to obtain services needed to live and work in the community); see also Yael Zakai Cannon, 
There’s No Place Like Home: Realizing the Vision of Community-Based Mental Health 
Treatment for Children, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1049, 1063 (attributing the limited access to 
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This Article is the first to address the newly enacted Achieving a Better 
Life Experience Act (the ABLE Act).8 The ABLE Act partially addresses 
outdated legal restrictions on access to government-provided habilitative care.9 
Although it is a clear victory and a major improvement in financial planning 
for the disability community, its solution is incomplete. As we mark the 
fiftieth anniversary of Medicaid,10 the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),11 and the fifteenth anniversary of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,12 there still exists no 
comprehensive means of safeguarding the quality of life of individuals like 
Thomas. Under the ADA, employers are not required to make 
accommodations for personal needs of daily living, such as hygiene, nutrition, 
and transportation, without which employment and community living are 
impossible.13 Instead, this responsibility falls to the states, which must provide 
care to individuals with developmental disabilities “in the most integrated 
setting appropriate.”14 The Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead requires 
states to provide support for community living when “the State’s treatment 
professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected 
persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably 
accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the 
needs of others with mental disabilities.”15 Indeed, a series of sweeping 
consent decrees has brought to light the power of Olmstead by requiring states 
to provide an unprecedented level of job and personal support to individuals 
with serious disabilities who are living in community with their typically-abled 
peers.16 
                                                                                                                     
mental health care for children to the “frequent failure of private insurance” and lack of 
adequate government-provided resources). 
 8 Stephen Beck, Jr., Achieving a Better Life Experience Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 
113-295, 128 Stat. 4056 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 529A, 3511, 7705 (West Supp. 2015)) 
[hereinafter ABLE Act of 2014]. 
 9 The purpose of the new law is to “assist individuals and families in saving private 
funds for the purpose of supporting individuals with disabilities [and t] o provide secure 
funding for disability-related expenses . . . that will supplement, but not supplant, benefits 
provided” through Medicaid and other government programs. ABLE Act of 2014, § 101, 
128 Stat. at 4056. 
 10 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 
343–52 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a–b, 1396c–d (2012)). 
 11 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). 
 12 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 13 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 25–26 & 
nn.95–101 (2004). 
 14 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2015); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (codification of 
ADA Title II).  
 15 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607. 
 16 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., DOJ Olmstead Enforcement by Circuit 
Court, ADA.GOV, [hereinafter Olmstead Enforcement], http://www.ada.gov/ 
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Olmstead’s new breadth is not enough. States provide some or all of the 
Olmstead mandates through Medicaid, and Medicaid is not universally 
available to individuals with serious disabilities. Instead, its reach is limited to 
those who live with very limited means. Income and asset limitations that bar 
access to Medicaid are impactful because states rely on Medicaid to provide 
Olmstead- and ADA-related services such as personal care and special job 
assistance, even when those services are not medical in nature.17 As a result, 
even the most sweeping consent decree or court decision under Olmstead may 
fail to provide greater access to disability-related services to individuals who 
are not Medicaid-eligible. 
Because it dictates access not only to medical care but also to necessary 
disability-related social services, Medicaid eligibility is crucially important to 
people with developmental disabilities, and through it, the government 
coordinates and pays for many services that are either not supported by private 
markets or that are cost-prohibitive.18 Means testing, which is the limitation of 
Medicaid eligibility to individuals at low levels of income and asset holdings, 
creates a bar to access for individuals with disabilities. As a result, typically 
only those individuals who qualify for other forms of public assistance, such 
as public housing and food stamps, can receive such services through 
Medicaid.19 Those who have savings, who receive an inheritance from a 
family member, or who earn a living wage are ineligible, even though 
habilitative services may be critical to continued employment and life 
satisfaction.20 For these people, securing access to Medicaid’s disability-
related services requires careful financial planning and limitations on 
employment. In light of these facts, the motivation of Thomas’s parents 
becomes clear. In order to ensure his future access to habilitative services, 
Thomas’s parents must turn him into a welfare claimant. Their seemingly 
bizarre choice preserves his access to disability-related social services that will 
enable him to avoid institutionalization when his parents can no longer care for 
him.21 
                                                                                                                     
olmstead/olmstead_enforcement.htm [http://perma.cc/2Z7T-8SHX] (describing court cases 
and consent decrees under Olmstead). 
 17 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 26 (noting that society’s response to disability 
historically has been “heavily medicalized” and that personal assistance and adaptive 
technology “are typically regarded as ‘medical’ services for which the health insurance 
system is responsible”). 
 18 Id. at 27–28 (“[P]rivate insurance—on which most nondisabled people rely for their 
health needs—fails to cover the services people with disabilities most need for 
independence and health.”). 
 19 See infra Part III.D. 
 20 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 27 (“[P]ublic insurance is saddled with 
requirements that lock people with disabilities out of the workforce.”). 
 21 Under 42 U.S.C § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2012), assets in a federally sanctioned special 
needs trust are not counted as Thomas’s assets for purposes of determining supplemental 
security income (SSI) or Medicaid eligibility. 
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As Thomas’s example demonstrates, Medicaid eligibility rules create 
perverse incentives when applied to disability-related services that are cost-
prohibitive or not readily available through private markets. Individuals with 
disabilities are incentivized to choose low-wage, volunteer, and part-time 
positions in order to preserve access to habilitative services. Furthermore, 
families like Thomas’s must preemptively choose government dependency for 
their children, even when families would prefer to help with necessities like 
rent, groceries, utilities, or private medical insurance. 
In an attempt to address perverse incentives created by Medicaid eligibility 
rules, Congress passed the ABLE Act in late December of 2014.22 This Article 
is the first to address the new legislation. Like the Olmstead consent decrees, 
the ABLE Act is both a vitally important lifeline and an insufficient one. It 
will allow individuals with significant disabilities and their families to save 
money for necessities without affecting Medicaid eligibility. But legislative 
compromises have limited its effectiveness. Contributions to savings are 
capped at a low amount that bears no relation to the magnitude of disability-
related expenses, and easy fixes that could have both preserved the fisc and 
protected individuals with disabilities went unused.23 Legal impoverishment, 
then, will remain a requirement for Medicaid eligibility for many people, and 
it will continue to be accomplished through the use of a federally sanctioned 
special needs trust like the one created for Thomas. These financial planning 
instruments may simultaneously force adult beneficiaries with disabilities to 
rely on public benefits such as housing, food assistance, and other entitlements 
while limiting their employment opportunities, denying them autonomy of 
decision-making, and interfering with natural family support relationships. 
Access to Medicaid for individuals with significant disabilities must be 
broadened. Prior attempts to remedy the problem have relied on the resources 
and participation of private actors such as family members. These attempted 
fixes are important because they preserve access. But at the same time, they 
impose dignitary and financial costs on individuals with disabilities, their 
families, the federal budget, and society as a whole. They also impose 
distributional costs because not all individuals with disabilities have access to 
private assistance. There is no compelling normative justification for the 
imposition of these costs, and the law should be amended to reduce or 
eliminate them. A public, rather than a private solution must be found. 
Amendment must be done with a conscious regard for commonly accepted 
goals, including freedom from paternalism, maximization of the autonomy of 
individuals with disabilities and their family members, and integration of 
                                                                                                                     
 22 See ABLE Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, 128 Stat. 4056 (codified at I.R.C. 
§§ 529A, 3511, 7705 (West Supp. 2015)).  
 23 I.R.C. § 529A(b) (limiting yearly contributions to the amount in effect under I.R.C. 
§ 2503(b) ($14,000 in 2015), and aggregate contributions to the limitation in effect for the 
relevant state’s § 529 college savings accounts). 
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individuals with disabilities into the community to the extent possible and 
desired.24 
This Article takes a counterintuitive position. Individuals with significant 
disabilities should be entitled to disability-related services and habilitative care 
through Medicaid regardless of their level of income or wealth. This solution 
is public rather than private; it does not rely on private actors for its 
implementation. Broadening access to Medicaid in this way has the potential 
to both increase tax revenue and reduce costs for state and federal government. 
By removing poverty as a barrier to access, government can offer disability-
related services to a broader segment of the population, enabling more 
individuals to enter the workforce. In addition, removing poverty as a barrier 
to access will eliminate perverse financial planning incentives that currently 
result in the artificial impoverishment of individuals with disabilities who then 
rely on non-disability-related government programs such as food and housing 
assistance. 
In recognition of the political difficulty and potential distributional 
concerns raised by the creation of a new entitlement, the Article offers a 
second solution: the removal of means testing as a bar to government-
coordinated habilitative care coupled with an income and asset insensitive 
Medicaid buy-in model for individuals at high levels of income or asset 
holding. If the unique fact of disability is found insufficient to justify the 
provision of habilitative care at no cost to the recipient, individuals with 
disabilities who have access to large pools of resources could be asked to pay 
either for inclusion in Medicaid and/or for government coordination of their 
services. To entirely deny these individuals access to government-coordinated, 
disability-related services, as the current law often does, makes little sense 
from either a normative or pragmatic perspective if these services are difficult 
to find or cost-prohibitive on the private market.25 Furthermore, broadening 
the constituency for government-coordinated, disability-related services is 
likely to bring political pressure to bear that might result in better, higher 
quality, or more varied services in the future. 
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of federal attempts to foster 
the integration of individuals with serious disabilities into the community. It 
also explains why these attempts have been insufficient to address the 
distinctive needs of those individuals. To date, the federal government has 
                                                                                                                     
 24 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 7–8 (noting consensus among “diverse disability 
rights activists” on the subjects of paternalism and integration). 
 25 One objection may be that if Medicaid resources are scarce, entry of wealthier 
individuals into the program will result in a shortage that will be detrimental to all 
enrollees. This argument ignores the possibility that a new revenue stream would allow 
Medicaid to expand its network of service providers. In addition, to the extent that 
Medicaid is currently viewed as a program for the poor, there may be less political will to 
improve or expand its disability-related services. Entry of individuals of higher 
socioeconomic position into the system may raise its political visibility and result in better 
or more services.  
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focused primarily on preventing overt discrimination on the basis of disability. 
There is, however, a growing recognition on the part of scholars and advocates 
that individuals with intellectual or other serious disabilities often need not 
only antidiscrimination measures but also specialized social support tailored to 
their distinctive needs.26 Part II concludes by drawing upon this insight to set 
normative goals for the revision of Medicaid eligibility guidelines that 
determine access to government-coordinated habilitative care. 
Part III describes the importance of a particular form of social support—
Medicaid-funded waiver services for the provision of government-coordinated 
habilitative care—and describes laws that both mandate and restrict access to 
those services. Waiver services, which allow individuals with intellectual 
disabilities to live in the community rather than in an institution, are difficult 
to purchase privately.27 Their provision is not, however, universally mandated 
by the ADA. Rather, their availability is governed by state law and may be 
severely restricted on the basis of a recipient’s income and asset holdings.28 As 
a result, individuals with disabilities and their families are presented with 
perverse incentives for minimization of work and saving as a means of 
preserving access to disability-related services. 
Part IV describes special needs trust planning, through which the federal 
government and some states have provided a means to work around state 
income and asset holding restrictions on Medicaid eligibility. This Part argues 
that special needs trust planning, while important, is normatively inferior to 
other solutions because it disproportionately burdens less wealthy or less 
legally sophisticated families and imposes dignitary and emotional harms on 
the trust beneficiary and the beneficiary’s family. In addition, because it relies 
on private actors for its implementation, special needs trust planning is not 
available to all individuals with disabilities. 
Part V describes the ABLE Act, a recent addition to the Internal Revenue 
Code. The ABLE Act provides a second means of preservation of Medicaid 
                                                                                                                     
 26 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 4 (“[T]he future of disability law lies as 
much in social welfare law as in antidiscrimination law.”); Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415, 1421–
22 (2007) (arguing that modern disability law should “leav[e] room for modern approaches 
to the delivery of separate services and maintenance of some disability-only institutions”); 
Francine J. Lipman, Enabling Work for People with Disabilities: A Post-Integrationist 
Revision of Underutilized Tax Incentives, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 409 (2003) (calling for 
more aggressive redistribution to individuals with disabilities); Theodore P. Seto & Sande 
L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1053, 1062 (2006) (noting that census data indicate that roughly half of all public 
benefits claimants have a disability); Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A 
Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 942–56 (proposing 
amendments to welfare law affecting individuals with disabilities). 
 27 See THE ARC, supra note 4, at 7–8 (more than 75% of families report that they 
cannot find reliable care providers, and 80% report that they do not have enough money to 
pay for care that their family member with a disability needs). 
 28 See infra Part III.C–D. 
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eligibility for individuals with intellectual or other serious disabilities by 
creating a tax-preferred savings account, the contents of which are not counted 
against Medicaid eligibility. This Part argues that although passage of the 
ABLE Act was a watershed moment for individuals with intellectual 
disabilities in the workforce, it remains a second-best solution. Once again, it 
relies on private actors for its implementation, but not all individuals with 
disabilities have access to private assistance or funds. As a result, like many 
tax expenditures, the ABLE Act favors legally sophisticated families who have 
disposable income. It may provide little or no additional Medicaid access to 
others. 
Part VI concludes that removal of income and asset restrictions on the 
provision of government-coordinated habilitative care is a superior, if counter-
intuitive, solution. It is a public solution that does not rely on private actors or 
funds for its implementation. It would satisfy normative goals on multiple 
fronts by preserving the autonomy of individuals with intellectual or other 
serious disabilities, by eliminating perverse incentives that encourage reduced 
employment and counterproductive trust planning, and by removing barriers 
that exclude families with lesser access to disposable income or legal advice. 
In addition, higher levels of workforce participation and saving by individuals 
with disabilities and their families would lessen the dependency of those 
individuals on non-disability-related government programs, freeing assets in 
those programs for other uses. 
II. A LAY PERSON’S BACKGROUNDER 
A. Antidiscrimination Law As an Incomplete Solution 
Calls for disability law reform have evolved from custodialism to post-
integrationism over several decades.29 Prior to the 1970s, the prevailing norm 
for care of individuals with disabilities was custodialism, in which individuals 
with significant disabilities were cared for in institutional settings.30 The late 
1960s, with the rise of the civil rights movement, marked a turning point in 
legal thinking about disability, with advocates calling for full inclusion of 
individuals with disabilities into work and community life.31 Called 
“integrationism” by its founders, Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd Matson, this 
movement was “part of a progression from the idea that others need to care for 
and protect persons with disabilities—custodialism—toward the idea that 
persons with disabilities should assert their own rights to equal treatment.”32 
                                                                                                                     
 29 See Weber, supra note 26, at 890–91 (observing that since the mid-twentieth 
century, “dramatic changes have occurred in the field of disability equality”). 
 30 See Seto & Buhai, supra note 26, at 1055–56 (providing an overview of the 
development of the post-integrationist model of disability law).  
 31 Id.; see also Weber, supra note 26, at 889 (describing progression in legal 
thinking). 
 32 Weber, supra note 26, at 890. 
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The late twentieth century saw notable victories of integrationism over 
custodialism in federal law, culminating in Congress’s 1990 enactment of the 
ADA.33 As the Supreme Court noted in Olmstead, the preamble to the ADA 
observes that “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate 
individuals with disabilities,” and that “discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . institutionalization.”34 
Accordingly, Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment.35 
Title II prohibits discrimination in public services provided by government,36 
and Title III prohibits discrimination in public accommodations provided by 
private actors.37 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead was also a victory for 
integration, albeit a measured one.38 The case involved two women who were 
confined to the psychiatric unit of an Atlanta hospital but who could have been 
given appropriate care in a community setting.39 The women claimed that 
Georgia’s failure to provide such care violated Title II of the ADA.40 In its 
ruling for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court wrote that institutionalization 
“severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including 
family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, 
educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.”41 In construing the 
ADA’s mandate that individuals with disabilities not “be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities 
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity,”42 the 
Court looked to a regulation of the Attorney General requiring public entities, 
such as the Atlanta hospital, to “administer services, programs, and activities 
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals 
with disabilities.”43 The Court concluded that states must provide treatment in 
                                                                                                                     
 33 The most celebrated of these, the ADA, prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
disability “in private employment, state and local governmental services, public 
accommodations, public transportation, communications, and other activities.” Id. at 890–
91. Precursors to the ADA included the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which “forbade 
discrimination against persons with disabilities in federally assisted activities,” and the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which “required that all children 
with disabilities receive a free, appropriate public education.” Id. at 890. 
 34 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 588 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)–(3)). 
 35 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101–108, 
104 Stat. 327, 303–37 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2012)).  
 36 Id. §§ 201–246, 104 Stat. at 337–53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–
12165 (2012)).  
 37 Id. §§ 301–310, 104 Stat. at 353–65 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–
12189 (2012)).  
 38 See generally Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581. 
 39 Id. at 581 (syllabus). 
 40 Id.  
 41 Id. at 601. 
 42 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
 43 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998)). 
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the community rather than in an institution when state medical professionals 
determine that a community placement is appropriate; the individual with a 
disability does not oppose community placement; and “the placement can be 
reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the 
State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.”44 In other words, the 
requirements of the ADA are met if a state has “a comprehensive, effectively 
working plan” to place individuals with disabilities “in less restrictive 
settings,” and a wait list that moves “at a reasonable pace not controlled by the 
State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated.”45 Two things are 
notable about the Court’s decision. First, integration was clearly the driving 
force behind the Court’s decision, and second, the Court struck a very 
pragmatic balance between the interests of states and those of individuals with 
disabilities. 
In recent years, litigated disputes between the federal government and the 
states have highlighted the potential reach of Olmstead and have increased 
access to community integration for individuals with disabilities who receive 
government-coordinated habilitative care.46 For example, a recent consent 
decree with Rhode Island requires the state to provide work opportunities for 
individuals with serious disabilities who are currently participating in sheltered 
workshops or who are graduating from high school.47 The state must provide 
support for forty hours during the work week, with the expectation that 
individuals will work, on average, in a supported employment job at 
competitive wages for at least twenty hours per week.48 For the remainder of 
the time, the state will assist individuals in community living “by aiding the 
development of social capital, including broad personal and professional 
networks, and individuals’ active participation and membership in integrated 
settings.”49 In addition, services “must include an adequate mix of leisure, 
employment-related, and daily life activities that are comparable to those 
activities” of typically-abled peers.50 An interim agreement with Texas 
requires the state to extend additional community living options to Medicaid-
eligible individuals currently in congregate care, including “supported and 
competitive employment, community volunteer activities, community learning 
and recreational opportunities, and other integrated day activities.”51 The 
government reached a similar settlement with Virginia that applies only to 
                                                                                                                     
 44 Id. at 607. 
 45 Id. at 605–06 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). 
 46 See Olmstead Enforcement, supra note 16 (providing summaries of and links to 
litigated disputes). 
 47 Consent Decree at 11–13, United States v. Rhode Island, No. 1:14-CV-00175-L-
PAS (D. R.I. Apr. 8, 2014). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 12. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Interim Settlement Agreement at 9, Steward v. Perry, No. 5:10-CV-01025-OG 
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2013). 
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those individuals who qualify for state assistance or who are currently residing 
in an institution.52 An agreement with Georgia requires the state to cease 
admitting individuals with disabilities to state-operated institutions entirely 
and to instead provide home and community based habilitative care, including 
supports for the families of individuals with disabilities.53 These broad 
agreements undoubtedly facilitate the integration of individuals with 
disabilities into the community in states where they apply. 
While they are great victories, the Olmstead consent decrees are not 
enough. They do not adequately protect individuals with disabilities who do 
not qualify for government assistance on financial grounds. Title II of the 
ADA prohibits discrimination in access to public services by requiring that 
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by 
any such entity.”54 The ADA says nothing about the exclusion of individuals 
from government programs on the basis of income, despite the fact that 
individuals with disabilities who wish to live in the community may need 
access to government programs that are not adequately replicated in the private 
market.55 To benefit from the breadth of the ADA under the Olmstead decrees, 
most individuals with disabilities still must qualify for Medicaid.56 
Medicaid eligibility remains a critical and high hurdle to the receipt of 
government-coordinated habilitative care. As the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the ADA and the fifteenth anniversary of Olmstead approach, it has become 
clear that the simple prohibition on discrimination embodied in the ADA is not 
sufficient to safeguard the quality of life of individuals with disabilities, and 
particularly individuals with intellectual disabilities.57 Integration must be 
accompanied by social support that is available to all individuals with 
significant disabilities and not just those whose level of impoverishment 
qualifies them for Medicaid. 
                                                                                                                     
 52 Settlement Agreement at 3, United States v. Virginia, No. 3:12-CV-00059-JAG 
(E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2012) (defining target population for receipt of services described in the 
settlement). 
 53 Settlement Agreement at 5, United States v. Georgia, No. 1:10-CV-249-CAP (N.D. 
Ga Oct. 19, 2010). 
 54 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (emphasis added).  
 55 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 56 For a discussion of the impact of Olmstead on entitlement to home-based 
community services for individuals who meet means testing requirements, see generally 
Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive Rights: A 
Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269 (2004). 
 57 See Colker, supra note 26, at 1422–23 (“Support for integration has not always 
accompanied support for genuine equality as measured by the principle of anti-
subordination.”). 
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B. Setting Goals for Reform 
Current scholarship on disability theory recognizes not only the need for 
prohibitions on discrimination but also the need for positive intervention to 
remove structural barriers that prevent individuals with disabilities from 
accessing and participating in the workforce and community.58 For example, 
although an employer may not exclude an otherwise qualified employee on the 
basis of disability, nothing in the ADA requires the employer to help the 
employee choose appropriate clothing or travel to work.59 The needs for these 
things—a separate workplace location and a particular style of dress, such as a 
wrinkle-free shirt—are social constructs based on typically-abled employees, 
and they create barriers to employment that are not mitigated by a simple ban 
on discrimination.60 As Ted Seto and Sande Buhai have described it, these 
impediments to full participation “have not been decreed by immutable natural 
laws . . . . They represent conscious choices that had the effect of including 
some groups, such as the dominant segments of society, and excluding others 
who were ‘different’ or disabled.”61 Currently, the costs of removing these 
barriers to full participation in work and other community activities fall 
primarily not on those who have created them, but rather on individuals with 
disabilities.62 These individuals, however, may not be well-positioned to 
defray such costs and are therefore disadvantaged in both the workplace and 
the community.63 
Mitigation of structural barriers can be accomplished in part through laws 
that either remove them or provide a means of surmounting them. The social 
safety net is of critical importance in this regard.64 “In short,” Samuel 
Bagenstos has argued, “the future of disability law lies as much in social 
welfare law as in antidiscrimination law.”65 Similarly, Francine Lipman has 
written, “If people with disabilities are to realize the promise of emancipation, 
society must . . . implement more aggressive measures that redistribute power 
and material resources in their favor.”66 Medicaid eligibility, and in particular 
the way in which it affects the eligibility pool for government-coordinated 
habilitative services, is an obvious target for reform. 
                                                                                                                     
 58 See Lipman, supra note 26, at 411 (“Specialized treatment is necessary to provide 
people with disabilities as a group sufficient power to end their disadvantaged status.”). 
 59 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 25–26 (describing structural barriers to 
employment). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Seto & Buhai, supra note 26, at 1072 (quoting Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and 
the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 166, 
174 (2000)). 
 62 Lipman, supra note 26, at 409. 
 63 Id. at 410 (observing that individuals with disabilities “have neither the resources 
nor the opportunities to achieve superiority”). 
 64 See id. (calling for redistribution to individuals with disabilities). 
 65 Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 4.  
 66 Lipman, supra note 26, at 410. 
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Autonomy and integrated living, to the extent that they are feasible and 
desired by particular individuals with disabilities, have historically been and 
should remain important goals of reform.67 Both are forwarded by access to 
habilitative services such as in-home assistance, transportation assistance, and 
adaptive equipment. Without these goals, and without such services, the law 
may regress toward custodialism. More than 187,000 individuals with 
intellectual or developmental disabilities lived in state institutions in 1967.68 
That number had fallen below 34,000 in 2009, and today, most individuals 
with intellectual or developmental disabilities live with their families.69 
Without a continued focus on fostering autonomy and independent living for 
these individuals, families will be unable to meet the challenges posed by 
caretaking.70 These families have very little market recourse, and without 
government assistance, integrated living arrangements may become unduly 
difficult.71 
Because of the distinctive needs of individuals with disabilities, 
antidiscrimination measures have proven inadequate to address barriers to 
integration.72 A second goal for reform should be to revise Medicaid eligibility 
rules in a way that avoids reliance on norms that have developed over time 
with reference to people who are typically-abled. “[S]pecial treatment for 
people with disabilities remains necessary in society and in the economy.”73 
As a result, scholars and advocates for reform must “imagine a world that 
acknowledges the fact of disability but avoids relying on norms and standards 
drawn with reference to the nondisabled individual.”74 These norms include 
adult self-sufficiency, the expectation of regular employment, literacy, and 
numeracy among others.75 Stated more specifically, current Medicaid 
                                                                                                                     
 67 Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 7–8 (noting “broad agreement among diverse 
disability rights activists” on goals of autonomy and full integration). 
 68 THE ARC, supra note 4, at 3. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. at 6 (nearly half of all caregivers report that they have more caregiving 
responsibilities than they can handle, and in twenty percent of families, one member has 
quit a job to stay home and provide support). 
 71 For instance, in the FINDS survey, more than eighty percent of families reported 
problems with finding noninstitutional community services, trained reliable home care 
providers, or respite services. Id. at 7. 
 72 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 4–5 (“Although this point may not be obvious 
from a scan of legal scholarship, activists ‘on the ground’ have increasingly understood the 
importance of the social welfare system to achieving the goals of the disability rights 
movement.” (footnote omitted)); Weber, supra note 26, at 891 (“The economic role of 
people with disabilities continues to depend less on the law of employment discrimination 
than on the law of welfare . . . .”). 
 73 Weber, supra note 26, at 891. 
 74 Id. at 891–92. 
 75 For instance, Mark Weber has argued that designing reasonable accommodations 
with reference to typically-abled people may further the integration of individuals with 
disabilities but may not fully address concerns about dignity and equality. Mark C. Weber, 
Disability Rights, Welfare Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2483, 2503–08 (2011). 
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eligibility rules assume that an adult who earns a sufficient amount of income 
or who possesses a sufficient amount of assets does not need habilitative 
assistance. In addition, the rules assume that a Medicaid claimant is able to 
understand the import of income and asset guidelines and to comply with 
them. This assumption may be unfounded in the case of individuals with 
intellectual and developmental disabilities, and yet failure to comply with the 
rules can result in the loss of habilitative care. Finally, by penalizing through 
loss of benefits individuals with disabilities who receive financial assistance 
from family and friends, the law embodies a stark false dichotomy between 
dependent and independent living. The issue of means testing was not 
addressed by the Affordable Care Act, meaning that change remains 
necessary.76 Any reform to the Medicaid eligibility rules affecting the 
provision of habilitative care should be cognizant of such assumptions. 
Making access to Medicaid waiver services dependent upon the income and 
asset holdings of the individual recipient does little to forward that vision. 
Rather, it imposes upon the individual and his or her family a social construct 
that direct beneficiaries of the social safety net must be economically poor. 
As a third goal, reform should abandon facial neutrality of the law in favor 
of equality of opportunity to maximize individual utility.77 (For the sake of 
simplicity, I will refer to this as “opportunity” or “quality of life,” although as 
I discuss in Part V, the distinctive needs of individuals with significant 
disabilities and the lack of homogeneity among their typically-abled 
counterparts make true comparison impossible for purposes of assessing 
horizontal equity. My comparison here is simply for the sake of rough justice.) 
Although strict income and/or asset limitations currently apply to all Medicaid 
claimants (i.e., the law is somewhat neutral on its face), the interaction of 
physical, intellectual, and developmental impediments with structural barriers 
to inclusion produces an adverse impact on individuals with significant 
disabilities.78 For all other claimants, the eligibility rules act as a gatekeeper to 
Medicaid programs that cover traditional healthcare, but for individuals with 
significant disabilities, they regulate access to both traditional healthcare and 
government-coordinated habilitative care. Without habilitative care, 
individuals with significant disabilities cannot have opportunities for the 
maximization of personal utility that are functionally equivalent to those of 
                                                                                                                     
 76 For a discussion of the Affordable Care Act’s effect on access to disability-related 
social services, see infra Part III.D.4. 
 77 Here, I am not referring to opportunities for employment, but rather to 
opportunities for an individual to maximize his or her utility. Maximization of personal 
utility might, for some individuals, come from employment, but for others, it might come 
from taking a class, enjoying time outside, or simply having company. Because the 
spectrum of disabilities covered by government-coordinated habilitative care is wide, a 
one-size-fits-all definition of opportunity (such as employment) would not be appropriate. 
 78 I am not claiming that individuals with severe disabilities are the only subgroup of 
Medicaid claimants that are adversely impacted. Because they are the focus of my inquiry, 
though, I will confine my discussion to the impact of eligibility rules on those individuals. 
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their typically-abled counterparts.79 To produce some semblance of neutrality 
with regard to opportunity, the law must account for the different ex ante 
positions of individuals with disabilities and those without. Medicaid income 
and asset limitations not only prevent individuals with significant disabilities 
from claiming traditional healthcare, but they also bar the delivery of services 
uniquely tailored to distinctive natural impediments as well as socially 
constructed barriers to full participation in the community. Failure to meet the 
income and asset requirements, then, affects more than just medical outcomes 
for individuals with significant disabilities. It also affects social and economic 
wellbeing; education and employment opportunities; political influence; and 
the satisfaction of other preferences tied to community living. Because 
Medicaid eligibility requirements produce this disparate result solely with 
reference to significant disability, they are discriminatory in their effect and 
should be amended to account not for the relative economic position of 
claimants ex ante but for the effect of eligibility on their opportunities and 
quality of life ex post.80 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF HABILITATIVE CARE  
AND RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS 
Social support, particularly habilitative care, is essential to the integration 
of individuals with developmental disabilities into the community.81 As 
Professor Bagenstos has noted, “[M]any individuals with disabilities face 
significant barriers to employment that operate well before they are ever in a 
position to be discriminated against . . . .”82 This is because they may have 
difficulty with everyday activities. As a result, “[m]any people with disabilities 
need personal-assistance services—attendants who assist with personal 
hygiene and other activities of daily living—to help them get out of bed and 
get to work.”83 In addition, these individuals may require assistive technology 
and transportation alternatives to fully participate in community life.84 
Statistics bear out the asserted need for habilitative care. A 2001 study 
estimated that over 65% of individuals with intellectual or developmental 
disabilities need assistance with activities of daily living, including bathing, 
                                                                                                                     
 79 Larson et al., supra note 6, at 6 (finding that over 65% of individuals with 
intellectual or developmental disabilities need assistance with activities of daily living). 
 80 I recognize that under some theories of justice, this argument may lead to the 
conclusion that groups other than individuals with severe disabilities should receive 
government-coordinated habilitative care. This, however, is not the subject of my inquiry, 
so I will not address it in this paper. I also do not attempt to argue that the Medicaid 
eligibility rules are unconstitutional as a result of disparate impact. 
 81 See NDSS, supra note 1. 
 82 Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 25. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. at 26. 
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dressing, eating, using a toilet, and getting in and out of bed.85 In a 2010 
national survey, more than 40% of family caregivers reported that individuals 
with intellectual or developmental disabilities had unmet needs “getting 
outside of the home for errands or to see a doctor . . . , managing finances . . . , 
transportation . . . , and household management.”86 More than 80% of family 
caregivers also reported providing transportation, cooking, doing laundry, or 
cleaning the house for their family member with a disability.87 Over 70% 
reported providing support with financial affairs, social arrangements, 
monitoring outside services, home maintenance, or recreational activities.88 
Sixty-nine percent provided help with administration of medications, and 
sixty-one percent aided in personal care and toilette.89 Eighty-four percent of 
these families reported difficulty in finding reliable home care providers;90 
80% did not have enough money to pay for care,91 and only 8% received 
private insurance funds to cover the cost of providing such care.92 Failure of 
the private market for habilitative care is clear, and government assistance is 
justified in this context. 
States typically provide coordinated habilitative care through a program 
colloquially referred to as a Medicaid or HCBS “waiver.”93 This section will 
provide a brief history of waiver programs, and it will describe, in pragmatic 
terms, the importance of waiver programs to individuals with intellectual 
disabilities. Finally, because access to waiver programs requires Medicaid 
eligibility, this section will describe Medicaid eligibility requirements that may 
apply to individuals with intellectual disabilities in various states. 
A. The Enactment of Waivers: A Shift from Custodialism to 
Integrationism 
A 1981 amendment to section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act—the 
Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) waiver program—permits the 
federal government to waive certain Medicaid eligibility requirements, 
                                                                                                                     
 85 Larson et al., supra note 6, at 6.  
 86 LYNDA ANDERSON ET AL., UNIV. OF MINN., RESEARCH & TRAINING CTR. ON CMTY. 
LIVING, 2010 FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS FOR DISABILITY SUPPORTS (FINDS) 
NATIONAL SURVEY, TECHNICAL REPORT PART 1, at 9–10 (May 2011), 
http://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3673 [http://perma.cc/Q2MN-8K6F] [hereinafter 
2010 FINDS SURVEY]. 
 87 Id. at 10. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at iv. 
 91 Id. at 24. 
 92 2010 FINDS SURVEY, supra note 86, at 12. 
 93 This a shortened way of referring to the Home and Community-Based Services 
(HCBS) Waiver program, which was enacted in section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act 
to provide community-based alternatives to institutionalization for individuals who are 
elderly, handicapped, or have intellectual disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (2012). 
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allowing states to offer community-based care as an alternative to 
institutionalization for individuals who are elderly or who have qualifying 
disabilities.94 Prior to the federal government’s creation of the waiver 
program, many individuals with intellectual or other qualifying disabilities 
received habilitative care solely within the confines of an institution.95 
Several factors led to Congressional recognition that community-based 
care was an important addition to social safety net.96 First, waivers were seen 
as “a first step towards recognizing that many individuals at risk of 
institutionalization can be supported in their homes and communities, thereby 
preserving their independence and bonds to family and friends, at a cost not 
higher than institutional care.”97 This was important because those individuals 
“frequently reported an unsatisfactory quality of life.”98 Second, 
institutionalization was too common.99 A number of studies showed that “at 
least one-third of persons residing in nursing facilities that were Medicaid 
funded would have been capable of living at home or in community residential 
settings if additional supportive services were available.”100 Finally, 
institutionalization was too costly.101 At the time, “[a] disproportionate 
percentage of Medicaid resources were being used for institutional long-term 
care.”102 Furthermore, the cost was not likely to decline.103 A 
contemporaneous study predicted that Medicaid nursing home expenditures 
                                                                                                                     
 94 See id.; see also Mary Jane Duckett & Mary R. Guy, Home and Community-Based 
Services Waivers, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 2000, at 123, 123, 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/HealthCareFinancing 
Review/downloads/00fallpg123.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ETN-LRGX]; Allen J. LeBlanc et 
al., Medicaid 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Services Waivers Across the States, 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 2000, at 159, 159–60, http://www.cms.gov/ 
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/HealthCareFinancingReview/downloads/ 
00winterpg159.pdf [http://perma.cc/QNV6-HTCJ]. 
 95 See Colker, supra note 26, at 1427–28 (describing the rise in prevalence of 
residential institutions serving individuals with disabilities during the 1950s through 
1970s). 
 96 It is worth noting that waiver services are also available not only to individuals with 
intellectual disabilities, but also to some individuals who are elderly or who have a certain 
physical disabilities. 42 C.F.R. § 441.301(b)(6) (2015) provides that states may provide a 
waiver to the aged or disabled, individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities, 
and individuals with mental illness. 
 97 See Duckett & Guy, supra note 94, at 123. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id.  
 100 Id.; see also A.E. Benjamin, An Historical Perspective on Home Care Policy, 71 
MILBANK Q. 129, 145 (1993) (describing conclusion of the Congressional Budget Office 
that up to between twenty to forty percent of individuals in institutions could be cared for 
less intensively). 
 101 Duckett & Guy, supra note 94, at 123. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Benjamin, supra note 100, at 145. 
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would triple over the coming decade,104 but in 1981, Congress and the Reagan 
administration slashed the federal budget.105 Waivers were statutorily required 
to “provide a cost-neutral alternative to institutional care, requiring the States 
to keep waiver costs at or below those of comparable institution-based 
service.”106 Finally, the matter carried some urgency as courts across the 
country were issuing orders to “deinstitutionalize persons with developmental 
disabilities.”107 Congress’s recognition of the need for some autonomy and 
community access, coupled with courts’ move toward forced 
deinstitutionalization culminated in the creation of waiver programs across the 
country and signaled a move away from a custodial model of care for 
individuals with developmental disabilities. 
B. Waiver Services 
Waiver programs allow states to provide a wide range of habilitative 
services through Medicaid.108 These services typically include aids to daily 
living such as personal care, homemaking, companionship, transportation, and 
adult day care.109 They also include case management by a social worker, and 
for individuals who have a regular caretaker, respite care which provides the 
regular caretaker with a break.110 The Social Security Act explicitly provides 
for those enumerated services, but other services can be provided by a state if 
the federal government approves the service.111 Because of this, “[s]tates have 
a great deal of flexibility in designing their own unique HCBS waiver 
program(s).”112 The original waivers focused on the individuals who were 
elderly or who had a qualifying disability (typically an intellectual disability) 
but the program has evolved to include waiver services that assist individuals 
with “physical disabilities, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), 
acquired brain injuries and other forms of severe disability, including, to a 
limited extent, chronic mental illness.”113 
                                                                                                                     
 104 Id. 
 105 John William Ellwood, Congress Cuts the Budget: The Omnibus Reconciliation Act 
of 1981, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 1982, at 50, 50, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ 
doi/10.1111/1540-5850.00549/pdf [http://perma.cc/E57W-38VW]. 
 106 See LeBlanc et al., supra note 94, at 160. 
 107 Duckett & Guy, supra note 94, at 123. 
 108 42 C.F.R. § 440.180(b) (2015) (listing specific services, including the following: 
(1) case management, (2) homemaker, (3) home health aide, (4) personal care, (5) adult 
day health care, (6) habilitation, and (7) respite care).  
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Duckett & Guy, supra note 94, at 124. 
 112 See id. 
 113 LeBlanc et al., supra note 94, at 159–60. 
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Various states provide a range of waiver services to individuals with 
qualifying disabilities.114 For instance, in Illinois, the Persons with Disabilities 
Waiver provides services including a personal assistant, home health aide, 
homemaker, adult day care, and specialized medical equipment.115 Similarly, 
the Adults with Developmental Disabilities Waiver provides services 
including home accessibility modifications, personal support, vehicle 
modification, skilled nursing, and occupational, speech and physical 
therapy.116 Another state, Ohio, provides services as varied as adult daycare, 
home delivered meals, and even pest control.117 All of these are examples of 
services that recognize the individual needs of people with qualifying 
disabilities while allowing them to live more independently in the larger 
community. 
C. Restrictions on Eligibility 
Waivers, while generally necessary for supported community living, are 
not universally available to individuals with disabilities. Instead, eligibility is 
restricted on the basis of medical and financial need.118 Because waivers were 
created as an alternative to institutionalization, federal regulations initially 
required states to offer them only to individuals who were eligible to be 
institutionalized.119 That restriction was loosened in 1997, and states may now 
choose to extend services to some individuals who would not qualify for 
institutional care.120 In addition, federal law places financial restrictions on the 
receipt of waiver services.121 “States have the option of setting financial 
eligibility criteria for the 1915(c) waivers at the same level as those for 
institutional placement, up to 300 percent of [the $2,000] Supplemental 
                                                                                                                     
 114 All fifty states provide waiver services to some degree. For additional information 
on states’ allocation of resources to waiver programs, see Medicaid Section 1915(c) Home 
and Community-Based Services Waivers Participants, by Type of Waiver, KAISER  
FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/participants-by-hcbs-waiver-type/ 
[http://perma.cc/8JVE-YWW5]. 
 115 Persons with Disabilities, ILL. DEP’T HEALTHCARE & FAM. SERVS., 
http://www.illinois.gov/hfs/MedicalClients/HCBS/Pages/disablities.aspx [http://perma.cc/ 
MG4X-N9CK].  
 116 Adults with Developmental Disabilities, ILL. DEP’T HEALTHCARE & FAM. SERVS., 
http://www.illinois.gov/hfs/MedicalClients/HCBS/Pages/DD.aspx [http://perma.cc/CK9C-
NBFW]. 
 117 For a fuller description of Ohio’s waiver services, see infra note 128 and 
accompanying text. 
 118 For a description of eligibility restrictions, see LeBlanc et al., supra note 94, at 160. 
 119 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(c)(1) (2015) (requiring that an evaluation show a reasonable 
chance that the individual would require institutional care within a month if waiver services 
are not provided). 
 120 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(i) (2012). 
 121 Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii). 
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Security Income (SSI) [asset holdings limitation].”122 Alternatively, states may 
have more stringent financial requirements for eligibility.123 Finally, each state 
must place a limit on the number of people who can receive the benefits of the 
waiver program.124 As a result, it may be difficult for an individual to qualify 
for waiver services despite the importance of those services for inclusion in the 
community. 
State restrictions on waiver eligibility generally track the federal statute 
with minor variations. For instance, New York focuses somewhat on 
autonomy. To be eligible for a waiver on the basis of developmental disability, 
an individual must be eligible for Medicaid; have a diagnosed developmental 
disability; be eligible for institutional care; have exercised agency in making 
the decision between receipt of waiver services or placement in an institutional 
facility; and maintain an appropriate living arrangement.125 Illinois adds 
language on cost-effectiveness. There, an individual must be a United States 
citizen or legal alien; be a resident of Illinois; be financially eligible for 
Medicaid; and require the necessary level of care for the requested waiver.126 
In addition, it must cost less to provide waiver services than it would cost to 
provide appropriate institutional care.127 Another variant, Ohio, focuses on 
categorization by providing different eligibility standards for an entire 
smorgasbord of waivers.128 
                                                                                                                     
 122 LeBlanc et al., supra note 94, at 160. The asset limitation for SSI is $6,000 for an 
individual in 2014, 300% of $2,000. See OASDI and SSI Program Rates & Limits, 2014, 
SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Oct. 2013), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/prog_ 
highlights/RatesLimits2014.html [http://perma.cc/S2FZ-GRYU] [hereinafter SSI Limits].  
 123 SSI Limits, supra note 122 (showing that the statute creates a ceiling by specifying 
maximum income eligibility). 
 124 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(i)(1)(C). 
 125 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 635-10.3 (2008). 
 126 Home and Community Based Services Waiver Program, ILL. DEP’T HEALTHCARE & 
FAM. SERVS., http://www.illinois.gov/hfs/medicalclients/HCBS/Pages/default.aspx [http:// 
perma.cc/4XLU-2B5B] [hereinafter IL HCBS]. Recipients may be eligible through the 
traditional route or through Medicaid buy-in, which allows individuals whose income 
exceeds the prescribed amount to purchase Medicaid access. This encourages Medicaid 
recipients to return to work while allowing them to maintain their Medicaid eligibility 
through the program. To be eligible for Medicaid under the buy-in program, known as 
Health Benefits for Workers with Disabilities (HBWD), an individual must (1) be 
ineligible for Medicaid for those with disabilities, (2) be a resident of Illinois, (3) be a U.S. 
Citizen or an eligible noncitizen, (4) be between the ages of 16 and 65, (5) meet the SSA 
definition of disability, (6) have a disability, (7) be employed, (8) have countable assets of 
$25,000 or less, and (9) have income less than 350% of the federal poverty line for the 
family size. See HBWD Eligibility, HEALTH BENEFITS FOR WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES 
(HBWD), http://www.hbwdillinois.com/eligibility.html [http://perma.cc/P6C8-L6EX].  
 127 IL HCBS, supra note 126.  
 128 To be eligible for waiver services in Ohio, an individual must be (1) eligible for 
Ohio Medicaid (through traditional Medicaid or the Medicaid buy-in), (2) in need of HCB 
Waiver services, and (3) enrolled in at least one HCB Waiver program. Each of the waivers 
in Ohio has its own set of eligibility criteria, but none are less restrictive than the general 
eligibility criteria listed above. They include, but are not limited to, the following: First, the 
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In all of the examples above, access to waiver services is limited on the 
basis of medical need (if one assumes that habilitative care is medical), but 
more importantly for individuals with qualifying disabilities, on the basis of 
financial need with waiver eligibility generally pegged to Medicaid eligibility. 
As discussed below, the definition of financial need adopted by the various 
states is unduly restrictive in many cases.129 In other words, a real-world 
definition of financial need, if one were to craft it, likely would be much 
broader than the legal definitions adopted by the federal government and the 
various states. As a result, it may be difficult for individuals to obtain waiver 
services even when financial need is real and habilitative need is great. 
D. Waiver Eligibility Is Generally Pegged to Medicaid Eligibility, and 
Medicaid Is Only Available to the Very Poor 
To be eligible for waiver services, an individual with intellectual or other 
qualifying disabilities generally must qualify for Medicaid assistance. 
Established in 1965, “[t]he Medical Assistance program, commonly known as 
‘Medicaid,’ ‘is a cooperative federal–state venture designed to afford medical 
assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the 
                                                                                                                     
Ohio Home Care Waiver (OHCW) Program provides nursing, personal care and skilled 
therapy services in addition to other more specific services. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5160-46-
04 (2015). To be eligible for OHCW, an individual must be financially eligible for HCBS 
in Ohio, be fifty-nine years or younger and require an intermediate or skilled level of care. 
The Ohio Home Care Waiver Program, OHIO DEP’T MEDICAID, http://medicaid.ohio.gov/ 
FOROHIOANS/Programs/OhioHomeCareWaiver.aspx [http://perma.cc/AF6H-T5RX]. 
Second, the Assisted Living Waiver Program pays the costs of living in an assisted living 
waiver program, freeing up income for the waiver beneficiary. Assisted Living Waiver 
Program, OHIO DEP’T MEDICAID, http://medicaid.ohio.gov/FOROHIOANS/Programs/ 
AssistedLiving.aspx [http://perma.cc/QLK6-AK9C]. To be eligible for the Assisted Living 
Waiver, individuals must be eligible for Medicaid, 21 years old or older, and in need of at 
least intermediary care. Id. Third, the PASSPORT Waiver Program provides a similar 
package of services as the Choices program, but is more widely available. PASSPORT 
Program, OHIO DEP’T AGING, http://www.aging.ohio.gov/services/passport/ [http:// 
perma.cc/SB7K-FR5S]. To be eligible for PASSPORT, an individual must be eligible for 
Medicaid, sixty years old or older, and in need of at least intermediary care. Id. In addition, 
some costs that the state pays for can be subject to estate recovery by Ohio. Id. Finally, the 
Individual Options Waiver Program and the Level One Waiver Program offer a similar list 
of services that are available, with the Level One program providing more options for 
services overall. To be eligible for either of those waiver programs, an individual must be 
eligible for Medicaid and need an ICF-IID (Level One), see Level One Waiver Program, 
OHIO DEP’T MEDICAID, http://medicaid.ohio.gov/FOROHIOANS/Programs/LevelOne.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/5ZDR-KZ7V], or ICF-MR (Individual Options) level of care, see 
Individual Options Waiver Program, OHIO DEP’T MEDICAID, http://medicaid.ohio.gov/ 
FOROHIOANS/Programs/IndividualOptions.aspx [http://perma.cc/D7PJ-SUQX]. 
 129 See infra Part III.D. 
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financial demands of necessary care and services.’”130 States administer the 
federal program and receive reimbursements for administration costs and 
“partial reimbursement for the costs of providing medical services.”131 
Each state sets its own Medicaid eligibility rules within guidelines 
provided by the federal government. States have three options for eligibility 
determinations applicable to individuals with disabilities.132 (A fourth method 
of eligibility determination, the use of modified adjusted gross income under 
the Affordable Care Act, applies to waiver services only at the election of the 
states and so far is of little help to individuals with disabilities who are seeking 
waiver services.)133 First, under section 1634 of the Social Security Act, a state 
may provide Medicaid to anyone who is determined to be eligible for 
supplemental security income (known as “SSI,” or more commonly, 
“welfare”) by the Social Security Administration.134 Second, a state also may 
choose to grant Medicaid to all SSI recipients who complete a separate state 
application.135 Third, under section 209(b) of the Social Security Act, a state 
may choose criteria that are more restrictive than SSI criteria, as long as they 
are not more stringent than the criteria used by the state in 1972.136 This is 
commonly referred to as the 209(b) option. 
                                                                                                                     
 130 Ramey v. Reinertson, 268 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting N.M. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Health Care Fin. Admin., 4 F.3d 882, 
883 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
 131 Id. 
 132 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.601 (2015) (describing financial eligibility methodologies that 
states may use). 
 133 See id. § 435.603(a), (j) (2015) (requiring states to calculate financial eligibility on 
the basis of modified adjusted gross income except in enumerated cases, of which 
disability is one); see also Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP 
Servs., MAGI: Medicaid and CHIP’s New Eligibility Standards 1 (Sept. 30,  
2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/program-information/ 
downloads/modified-adjusted-gross-income-and-medicaid-chip.pdf [http://perma.cc/9Z5C-
K39H] (“The new rules apply to most people who are eligible for Medicaid and CHIP, but 
not the elderly or people who qualify based on a disability.”); MARYBETH MUSUMECI, THE 
KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, ISSUE BRIEF: THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT’S IMPACT ON MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY, ENROLLMENT, AND BENEFITS FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES 4 (Apr. 2014), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/ 
8390-02-the-affordable-care-acts-impact-on-medicaid-eligibility.pdf [http://perma.cc/N7PS-
YU63]. 
 134 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.601 (describing financial eligibility methodologies that states 
may apply). 
 135 Id. States electing this option include Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Oregon, Utah and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. See SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS), at SI 01715.010 (May 2014) 
[hereinafter POMS], https://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501715010 [http://perma.cc/ 
UJ5E-YZ7D]; see, e.g., State of Alaska, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Pub. 
Assistance, Application for Services (revised Feb. 2012), http://dpaweb.hss.state.ak.us/e-
forms/pdf/gen50b.pdf [http://perma.cc/P2QY-Z6ST].  
 136 42 C.F.R. § 435.811(d); Ind. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Payne, 592 N.E.2d 714, 722 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that Indiana’s Medicaid eligibility requirements in 1972 
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1. Medicaid Eligibility Under Section 1634 of the Social Security Act 
To qualify for Medicaid, a person must satisfy stringent restrictions on 
income, asset holding, and severity of disability.137 In many states, an 
individual with a disability is eligible for Medicaid if that individual also is 
eligible for supplemental security income (SSI) under federal rules.138 An 
individual is eligible for SSI if that individual meets several requirements 
including but not limited to the following: the individual is aged, blind, or 
disabled; has a limited income;139 and has limited resources.140 Other 
requirements include certain restrictions on citizenship, time spent abroad, and 
fulfillment of certain administrative requirements.141 
For SSI purposes, “disability” is the “inability to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”142 This 
definition of disability “is much more exacting”143 than the definition provided 
by the ADA, which merely requires “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.”144 Because the scope of 
the SSI definition has been discussed elsewhere, let us assume (perhaps 
unrealistically) that most individuals with intellectual or other qualifying 
disabilities meet the definition and that income and asset limitations are the 
primary impediments to Medicaid eligibility.145 
The income limitations applicable to SSI eligibility are strict. The 
maximum federal benefit available to an otherwise qualifying individual who 
pays for her own living expense is $733 per month in 2015.146 A qualifying 
                                                                                                                     
allowed a resource spend down and the state’s current rule could not be more restrictive 
that its 1972 resource rule). 
 137 See generally Part III.D. (describing eligibility requirements). 
 138 Only ten states do not use the SSI rules as a basis for determining eligibility. They 
are Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia. See POMS, supra note 135, at SI 01715.010. 
 139 SOC. SEC. ADMIN, UNDERSTANDING SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME 10–12 
(2015) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING SSI], https://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/text-
understanding-ssi.htm [https://perma.cc/Q69D-L7GD] (explaining that limited income 
includes money earned at work, free food and shelter, and any other money received such 
as SSI, worker’s comp., and unemployment benefits). 
 140 Id. at 9 (explaining that limited resources are $2,000 for an individual, and $3,000 
for a couple with certain exclusions). 
 141 Id. at 12. 
 142 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
 143 Weber, supra note 26, at 896. 
 144 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
 145 Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 33; Lucie Schmidt, The Supplemental Security Income 
Program and Welfare Reform 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Public Policy Discussion 
Paper No. 12-3, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285082 [http://perma.cc/F6TR-EVJ8].  
 146 See UNDERSTANDING SSI, supra note 139, at 9. 
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couple may receive up to $1,082 in the same circumstance.147 These amounts 
are reduced dollar-for-dollar by “countable income.”148 The term “countable” 
is defined in the negative.149 Income that is not countable includes, among 
other things, the first $20 received each month, the first $65 of earned income 
each month, half of earned income received over $65, and the value of other 
forms of public assistance, such as home energy assistance or Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) payments.150 In other words, an 
individual who receives more than the aggregate of these amounts plus the 
allowed amount will receive no SSI payment at all and will not be eligible for 
Medicaid under this standard.151 
The asset limitations applicable to SSI eligibility are also difficult to 
satisfy. To qualify for SSI, an individual must not have more than $2,000 in 
resources, and a couple must not have more than $3,000 in resources.152 
Countable resources include cash, assets in bank accounts, stocks and bonds, 
real and personal property, life insurance policies, vehicles, and anything that 
could be sold for cash.153 Resources owned by an adult’s spouse or a child’s 
parent are also included.154 Not all resources are countable, however. 
Resources that are exempt include a personal home, household goods and 
personal effects, burial spaces, and one motor vehicle.155 In addition, under the 
Plan to Achieve Self Support (PASS) program, the Social Security 
Administration will allow individuals with disabilities to save money in 
furtherance of an employment related goal, such as the purchase of a 
computer, without counting the savings against SSI eligibility.156 Generally 
speaking, though, the asset limitations are low. 
                                                                                                                     
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 21–22. 
 149 See id. at 20–21 (listing income items that are not countable). 
 150 Id. at 21. 
 151 See id. at 20–23. 
 152 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 139, at 9. 
 153 Id. at 17.  
 154 Id.  
 155 Id. 
 156 “PASS lets persons with disabling conditions set aside money for purchases, 
installment payments and down payments for things like a vehicle, wheelchair, or a 
computer if needed to reach their work goal.” Plan to Achieve Self-Support (PASS),  
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/pass.htm [http:// 
perma.cc/ZGK2-U2D4]. Money set aside through the PASS program will not count 
towards SSI eligibility, and if an individual is already SSI eligible then enrolling in the 
PASS program will increase the benefits received through SSI. Spotlight on Plan to 
Achieve Self-Support, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/spotlights/spot-
plans-self-support.htm [http://perma.cc/5LK3-YBLR]. To enroll in the PASS program, an 
individual must (1) state a specific work goal, (2) in writing, (3) with a detailed list of 
necessary expenses to achieve the work goal, and (4) a reasonable time frame for the work 
goal to be achieved. Elements of a Plan to Achieve Self-Support, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/passelements.htm [http://perma.cc/5NS4-
XUA6]. 
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Despite PASS and similar programs, the income and asset limitations 
placed on SSI recipients militate against financial security. Individuals with 
intellectual or other qualifying disabilities who depend on Medicaid for access 
to waiver services are necessarily impoverished under this standard. 
Applicable income limitations may complicate work arrangements, and asset 
limitations leave these Medicaid recipients exposed to financial shock. For 
instance, imagine having only $2,000 to replace the engine in a car or move to 
a new apartment. Making the availability of waiver services dependent on this 
level of impoverishment makes little sense, particularly when these services 
may be necessary for independent living and yet difficult to coordinate and 
purchase. 
2. Medicaid Eligibility Under the 209(b) Option 
A second avenue to Medicaid eligibility, known as the 209(b) option, 
allows states to adopt Medicaid eligibility criteria which are more restrictive 
than the SSI rules, so long as the criteria chosen are not more restrictive than 
those employed by the state in 1972 for medical assistance under the state–
federal welfare program replaced by SSI.157 In order to maintain their forty-
year old income and asset limitations, though, states must offer a spend-down 
option.158 Meant to aid the “medically poor,” a spend-down option requires a 
state to provide Medicaid coverage if an individual’s out-of-pocket medical 
expenses are greater than the amount by which the individual’s income 
exceeds the eligibility amount.159 For example, if a state requires income of 
less than $800 per month, and an individual’s income is $1,000 each month, 
the individual may still qualify for Medicaid if the excess $200 is used for 
qualifying medical expenses. 
Virginia is one example of a 209(b) state. To receive Medicaid coverage, 
an individual with a disability must have income of less than eighty percent of 
the federal poverty line160 and must not have “countable resources in excess of 
$2,000 for one person or $3,000 for a couple.”161 This income requirement for 
Medicaid eligibility, which is $9,336 in 2014, is even lower than that 
employed in SSI determinations.162 As a consequence, it restricts access to 
                                                                                                                     
 157 42 C.F.R. § 435.811(d)(2) (2015). According to the Social Security Administration, 
there are ten 209(b) states: Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia. See POMS, supra note 135, at SI 
01715.010. 
 158 42 C.F.R. § 435.135(c). 
 159 Id. 
 160 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-40-220(D) (2010). 
 161 Va. Dept. of Soc. Servs., Medicaid Fact Sheet #15: Aged, Blind or Disabled 
Individuals with Income Less than or Equal to eighty percent of the Federal Poverty Level 
(Jan. 2012), http://www.dss.virginia.gov/files/division/bp/medical_assistance/intro_page/ 
covered_groups/adults_aged_65/D032-03-0631-13-eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/HWM4-XARD]; 
see also 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-40-230(B) (2010).  
 162 Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 3593 (Jan. 22, 2014). 
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waiver services even more severely than the SSI eligibility requirements 
would. A medical spend-down provision applies to individuals whose income 
exceeds the limit but whose medical expenses soak up the excess income.163 
Again, because of the very low threshold on income and asset holdings, 
individuals in 209(b) states must choose between access to waiver services or 
financial security and independence from non-disability-related government 
programs. 
3. Medicaid Eligibility Through Buy-In 
In an effort to ameliorate the harsh effect of Medicaid eligibility 
requirements on the work-related decisions of individuals with disabilities, the 
federal government permits states to create Medicaid buy-in programs for such 
individuals who are employed.164 Under a Medicaid buy-in program, 
individuals with disabilities can pay for access to Medicaid in the same way 
that they might pay for private insurance (although private insurers’ coverage 
of habilitative care is usually limited or nonexistent).165 Buy-in programs have 
been adopted by at least thirty-seven states to date,166 and they represent an 
important step forward in preserving autonomy and dignity for individuals 
with qualifying disabilities. Individuals who qualify for the buy-in may choose 
to work without losing access to waiver services. 
Buy-in programs are not available to everyone, and the premiums may be 
costly. The Balanced Budget Act “[a]llows a state to offer Medicaid coverage 
to any employed person with a disability who has a net family income below 
250% of the Federal poverty level for a family of the size involved.”167 In 
addition, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act allows a 
state to cover individuals through Medicaid through two separate groups: the 
basic coverage and medical improvement groups.168 The basic coverage group 
allows states to offer Medicaid “to working individuals . . . who, except for 
                                                                                                                     
 163 VA. DEPT. OF SOC. SERVS., VOL. XIII, MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY MANUAL 
§ M1320.100(a) (May 2015), https://www.dss.virginia.gov/files/division/bp/medical_ 
assistance/manual_transmittals/manual/m13r.pdf [http://perma.cc/QM53-VY5X].  
 164 BOB WILLIAMS ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEEPING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
WHEN YOU WORK: MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAMS 17 (Feb. 2005), 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/keeping-medicare-and-medicaid-
when-you-work-2005-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QTE-83XK].  
 165 Id. 
 166 LAW, HEALTH POLICY & DISABILITY CTR., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO STATE MEDICAID 
INFRASTRUCTURE GRANT (MIG) INITIATIVES: MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAMS § D.1 (Dec. 
2006), http://disability.law.uiowa.edu/lhpdc/rrtc/mig/#sectD1 [http://perma.cc/8M5Z-
5MUP] (Table of State Medicaid Buy-In Program Implementation and Enrollments). 
 167 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 164, at 17. For additional explanation, see the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4733, 111 Stat. 251, 522, adding 
subclause (XIII) to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii). 
 168 For additional explanation, see generally WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 164, at 17. 
2015] MAKING THE LAW MORE ABLE 1283 
their income and resource levels, are eligible to receive SSI.”169 Under basic 
coverage, states can establish their own income and resource standards.170 For 
instance, the State of Illinois allows individuals to buy-in so long as their 
countable assets do not exceed $25,000 and their income does not exceed 
350% of the federal poverty line.171 For a single individual in 2014, that 
amount was $3,404 per month.172 Premiums for the buy-in may be as low as 
$6 per month or as high as $500 per month depending on the purchaser’s 
income.173 In addition to basic coverage, states may provide a medical 
improvement buy-in “to employed individuals with a medically improved 
disability who lose Medicaid eligibility under the group described above [basic 
coverage] because they no longer meet the SSI definition of disability.”174 
This option is important because the SSI definition of disability hinges on an 
individual’s ability to work.175 By definition, someone who is able to “engage 
in any substantial gainful activity” does not have a disability for purposes of 
SSI, making the medical improvement buy-in an important backstop to the 
basic coverage buy-in.176 
Medicaid buy-in programs are valuable to individuals who must protect 
access to waiver services, but they have two serious flaws: they are available 
only to individuals who are employed, and asset limitations continue to 
apply.177 The requirement that an individual be employed before using a buy-
in makes little sense if Congress’s purpose in creating the buy-in was to 
counteract the harsh effect of Medicaid eligibility requirements on individuals 
with intellectual or other significant disabilities. These individuals may have 
income from sources other than employment, such as gifts from family and 
                                                                                                                     
 169 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XV) (2012). 
 170 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 164, at 17. For an example of basic coverage, see 
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5160:1-5-03 (Westlaw through Oct. 2, 2015), describing Ohio’s 
Medicaid Buy-In for Workers with Disabilities (MBIWD). In Ohio, only income is counted 
for eligibility purposes and an individual’s countable income must be below 250% of the 
federal poverty line. Id. § 5160:1-5-03(D)(1). Illinois permits countable assets of up to 
$25,000 and income up to 350% of the federal poverty level. See HBWD Eligibility, supra 
note 126.  
 171 HBWD Eligibility, supra note 126.  
 172 Id. 
 173 See HBWD Premium Chart, HEALTH BENEFITS FOR WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES 
(HBWD), http://www.hbwdillinois.com/assets/hfsweb004.pdf [http://perma.cc/DL3L-R796]. 
 174 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 164, at 17. 
 175 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
 176 Id. 
 177 See Medicaid Employment Initiatives, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/ 
Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Delivery-Systems/Grant-Programs/ 
Employment-Initiatives.html [http://perma.cc/BD2Q-F4X9]. For a description of asset 
limitations, see LAW, HEALTH POLICY & DISABILITY CTR., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO STATE 
MEDICAID INFRASTRUCTURE GRANT (MIG) INITIATIVES: MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAMS § D.2 
tbl.2 (Dec. 2006), http://disability.law.uiowa.edu/lhpdc/rrtc/mig/#sectD2 
[http://perma.cc/Z7FU-8VLT] (Tables of State Medicaid Buy-In Program Design Features). In 
2006, the applicable asset restriction could be as low as $999.99 or as high as $75,000. Id. 
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friends, or perhaps even investment income. There simply is no empirical 
evidence to suggest that individuals with disabilities who are employed are in 
greater need of waiver services than those who are not, and requiring 
employment as a condition of buy-in wrongly suggests a higher level of 
deservedness inherent in those who are able-bodied enough for work. In some 
cases, strongly incentivizing work for an individual with a significant 
disability may even be economically wasteful and not in keeping with a civil 
rights approach to disability law.178 Denying buy-in access to individuals with 
disabilities who cannot work may preclude them from participation solely on 
the basis of their disability, which is the source of their exclusion from 
community life in the first instance. In effect, the work requirement says, “we 
will not help you with inclusion because you have been already excluded.” 
Even if we accept employment as a criterion for buy-in eligibility, the buy-
in requirement creates inequality on the basis of disability as between workers 
who are otherwise similarly situated with the exception of disability. This is 
because the medical needs of typically-abled workers are more likely to be 
fully covered by private insurance, whereas habilitative services typically are 
not.179 A worker who requires habilitative services already stands at a 
disadvantage relative to her able-bodied colleagues, and forcing her to expend 
resources for the Medicaid buy-in further exacerbates that inequality. Finally, 
imposition of asset holding requirements on access to buy-in programs 
prevents individuals with disabilities from saving adequate resources to protect 
against financial shock, and it leaves them exposed to loss of waiver services 
through receipt of a disqualifying gift or bequest.180 So while Medicaid buy-in 
programs are an improvement over more limited access to waiver services, 
they suffer from some of the same normative problems as the eligibility 
guidelines themselves. 
4. Medicaid Eligibility Under the Affordable Care Act 
Implementation of the Affordable Care Act181 has encouraged some states 
to increase access to Medicaid, but the expansion does not automatically apply 
                                                                                                                     
 178 See Weber, supra note 75, at 2507–08. 
 179 See Bagenstos, supra note 13, at 27 (noting that private insurance “fails to cover the 
services people with disabilities most need for independence and health”). 
 180 See Saving for an Uncertain Future: How the ABLE Act Can Help People with 
Disabilities and Their Families: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation & IRS 
Oversight of the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. 33 (2014) [hereinafter ABLE Hearing] 
(prepared statement of Sara C. Wolff, Self-Advocate & Board Member, National Down 
Syndrome Society (NDSS)) (“Like most individuals with disabilities, people with Down 
Syndrome and other conditions are out living their parents. Families, like mine, need to rest 
assured that they can equally care for their children and adults with disabilities, just like 
they can for their other children and family members.”).  
 181 Thirty states and the District of Columbia implemented the Affordable Care Act 
expansion at the beginning of 2015: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
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to waiver services for individuals with disabilities. States that adopted the 
expansion have opened Medicaid to all adults whose modified adjusted gross 
income is up to 138% of the federal poverty line.182 In 2015, that amount was 
$16,242 for a single individual.183 Adults with disabilities whose incomes fall 
below this threshold amount qualify for Medicaid coverage under the 
expansion.184 Furthermore, no asset limitation applies.185 As a result, a larger 
number of adults with disabilities may be covered for routine medical care 
under the expansion. 
Eligibility under the expansion, however, does not automatically provide 
the same suite of benefits as eligibility resulting from disability.186 Unless a 
state elects otherwise and receives permission from the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), the state must provide a particular suite of 
benefits, known as the alternative benefit plan, to individuals that qualify 
through the expansion.187 Because states must craft the alternative benefit plan 
with reference to designated commercial insurance plans, waiver services 
typically will not be covered by the Medicaid expansion.188 In states that do 
not seek HHS approval for an election to deviate from the alternative benefit 
plan, individuals with intellectual or other qualifying disabilities who seek 
government-coordinated habilitative care still must satisfy the requirements 
applicable to eligibility through disability.189 
States may request permission from HHS to offer waiver services to adults 
who become eligible for Medicaid through the expansion.190 In doing so, the 
state must choose whether to add some or all of its waiver programs to the 
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expansion coverage.191 If the state fully conforms the new alternative coverage 
to its original state plan and vice versa, individuals with disabilities may 
qualify for waiver services under the Medicaid expansion.192 If the traditional 
state plan and the alternative benefit plan vary, however, an individual’s 
access to particular services will continue to be governed by that individual’s 
form of eligibility, and some or all waiver services will be available only to 
individuals that meet the state’s existing eligibility criteria for coverage of 
disability.193 As of November 2015, of the thirty-one states adopting Medicaid 
expansion, only six sought to deviate from the statutorily described program, 
and of these, none sought to include HCBS waiver eligibility in their Medicaid 
expansion package.194 
In summary, waiver services may be essential to an individual with a 
qualifying disability who wants to live and work in a community, but waivers 
are subject to strict income and asset limitations. Although there is some 
variance among states, federal law limits the availability of Medicaid-funded 
services to only those individuals who live in poverty. This approach might be 
unobjectionable if coordinated services were readily available and easily 
affordable in the private marketplace, but where this assumption fails, 
Medicaid eligibility rules applicable to waiver services fail to live up to 
normative goals of promoting autonomy, assisting with integration in the 
community to the extent possible and desired, and refraining from the 
imposition of norms developed with reference to the typically-abled. 
IV. TRUST PLANNING AND THE DELIBERATE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
INDIVIDUALS WITH QUALIFYING DISABILITIES 
The strict income and asset limitations embodied in states’ Medicaid 
eligibility guidelines may lead families to protect a loved one’s eligibility 
through use of a special needs trust (also sometimes referred to as a Medicaid 
protection trust). Recall the example of Thomas. In the absence of trust 
planning, he will inherit some or all of his parents’ assets upon their death. 
Unless his parents are virtually penniless, this inheritance will result in 
Thomas’s disqualification from Medicaid, causing him to lose access to 
habilitative services that he will need to maintain a satisfactory quality of life. 
However, the assets inside of a properly structured protection trust are not 
counted as assets of the beneficiary for purposes of Medicaid.195 Three forms 
of trust are commonly used, two of which are sanctioned by federal statute: the 
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 194 See MUSUMECI & RUDOWITZ, supra note 183, at 1. 
 195 See Taryn D. Walker, Comment, Congress or the Social Security Administration: 
Who Defines a Special Needs Trust?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1055, 1056 (2013) (stating 
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Medicaid payback trust and the pooled trust.196 With each of these trusts, 
families preserve assets for use of a beneficiary with a disability while also 
preserving the beneficiary’s ability to claim government benefits.197 
Despite its initial appeal, the Medicaid protection trust is not costless. 
Assets protected in trust may not be used to purchase goods or services that are 
available through government programs.198 As a result, a trust may hold 
limitless assets, none of which could be distributed to the beneficiary for basic 
costs of living, such as housing, without jeopardizing the beneficiary’s access 
to Medicaid.199 So an individual with a qualifying disability might use trust 
funds to vacation in Tahoe every winter but would still be required to qualify 
for government food assistance in order to receive waiver services. The 
following paragraphs will describe three commonly used protection trusts and 
will describe why (in terms more technical than “Tahoe”) they are insufficient 
to address normative problems and perverse incentives created by means 
testing Medicaid’s provision of habilitative services. 
A. A Brief Explanation of Protection Trusts 
1. Medicaid Payback Trusts 
Medicaid payback trusts were created by Congress in 1993 as a means of 
protecting individuals with disabilities from government cutbacks in Medicaid 
spending.200 Two kinds are available.201 The first is created for the benefit of a 
person with a disability who is under the age of sixty-five and from which “the 
State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such 
individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf 
                                                                                                                     
 196 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) (2012) (describing common law supplemental needs 
trusts); Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabilities: The 
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including “essential food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care.” 
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community). 
 201 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A)–(B). 
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of the individual [by Medicaid].”202 This form of trust may only be established 
by a parent, grandparent, legal guardian of the beneficiary, or a court, using 
assets of the beneficiary.203 A second form of payback trust does not suffer 
from the same limitation on settlors, but it may receive only pension, Social 
Security, or other income of the beneficiary.204 Again, upon the beneficiary’s 
death, any trust assets that haven’t been spent must be used to repay the state 
for Medicaid expenditures of the beneficiary.205 
Legal strictures on the beneficiary’s ability to demand trust funds or to use 
them for many common expenses limit the usefulness of Medicaid payback 
trusts to beneficiaries. Specifically, trust funds may be used only for 
supplemental expenses. In Ohio, for instance, supplemental expenses are those 
that ordinarily would not be covered by some form of government 
assistance.206 In other words, if the beneficiary incurs expenses for which a 
government program is available, such as housing or food, trust funds may not 
be used to cover the expenses. In fact, the law is even more explicit. It 
provides that trust funds may not be used for “basic necessities” including 
“essential food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care.”207 Instead, 
funds must be used for expenses not covered by government programs (a 
claim denied by Medicaid or habilitative services not available through the 
government, for instance), or they may be used for extras such as vacations, 
hobbies, cable television, companionship, and cosmetic surgery.208 The 
normative legitimacy of these spending restrictions is truly questionable if 
payback trusts are meant to improve the quality of life of individuals with 
qualifying disabilities, particularly if one assumes that quality of life depends, 
in part, on the satisfaction of an individual’s preferences for basic necessities 
that may not be included in programs for government assistance. For example, 
a beneficiary may prefer, and have trust resources sufficient to obtain, 
nonsubsidized housing. So while they are an incredibly important component 
of special needs planning, Medicaid payback trusts provide neither sufficient 
assurance to worried families nor adult decision-making power to individuals 
with disabilities even when those individuals directly earned, through labor, 
the funds in the trust. As a result, Medicaid payback trusts are a suboptimal 
answer to normative and pragmatic concerns raised by means-tested access to 
government-coordinated habilitative care. 
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2. Pooled Trusts 
A second form of Medicaid protection trust, the pooled trust, was also 
codified in 1993.209 The pooled trust is similar to an ordinary payback trust, 
with three prominent distinctions. First, the trust must be administered by a 
charitable organization that pools and invests funds for the benefit of persons 
with disabilities while maintaining separate accounting for each beneficiary.210 
Second, upon the death of the beneficiary, the remaining trust corpus may 
either be retained by the charitable organization for the benefit of its mission, 
or it may be repaid to the state in an amount equal to the amount of Medicaid 
benefits received by the beneficiary.211 Third, unlike an ordinary payback 
trust, a pooled trust may be settled by the beneficiary herself.212 
Although this form of trust is somewhat less paternalistic in its conception 
of the individual with a disability—she may settle the trust herself and may 
choose a charitable remainderman—it is subject to the same spending 
restrictions as the Medicaid payback trusts described above.213 As a 
consequence, the trust funds cannot be used for food, housing, or basic 
medical care even though they may be used for a trip to Disney World or 
porcelain veneers on one’s teeth.214 While this structure is superior to one in 
which an individual with a disability must choose between financial stability 
and Medicaid eligibility, it is obviously flawed as a means of achieving 
normative goals of autonomy and dignity for individuals with disabilities or as 
a means of providing assurance to worried family members. 
3. Common Law Discretionary Trusts 
Like Medicaid payback trusts and pooled trusts, discretionary trusts (also 
known as supplemental needs trusts) are designed to supplement rather than 
supplant government benefits provided to the beneficiary who has a 
disability.215 Like Medicaid payback trusts, these trusts restrict the trustee 
from making distributions of funds to cover basic needs such as food and 
housing.216 Unlike Medicaid payback trusts and pooled trusts, however, 
discretionary trusts are not enshrined in federal law. Rather, they are governed 
by state law.217 As a result, they need not contain the Medicaid payback 
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provision required by federal statute. Upon the beneficiary’s death, the 
remainder of trust funds is distributed to remaindermen designated by the 
settlor rather than to the government or to the pooled trust administrator.218 
A number of states have codified discretionary trust law. Ohio’s provision 
is typical. By state statute, the trust must be irrevocable, and distributions may 
be made “only at the trustee’s discretion.”219 Furthermore, the trust may not 
include “any standards to guide the trustee in exercising its discretion to make 
distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary.”220 As a result, a 
discretionary trust must not contain a support standard that would permit a 
beneficiary to compel distributions. In addition, state law prohibits 
withdrawals by the beneficiary.221 Finally, to preserve Medicaid eligibility, the 
trust must contain “[p]recatory language regarding its intended purpose of 
providing supplemental goods and services to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiary, and not to supplant benefits from public assistance programs.”222 
It also must contain a “prohibition against providing food, clothing, and shelter 
to the beneficiary.”223 New York’s law also permits the use of such 
language,224 and Minnesota requires it.225 
B. Protection Trusts Are Not Enough 
In light of the goals of promoting autonomy, assisting integrated living to 
the extent desired and practical, and alleviating harm caused by the improper 
reliance on norms of the typically-abled in Medicaid eligibility law, protection 
trusts are better than nothing. In contrast to a world that permits no asset 
protection, the current system provides some measure of autonomy by 
providing a source of funding for the discretionary expenses of an individual 
with an intellectual or other qualifying disability, who now may choose to eat 
out, take a class, go on vacation, or engage in other life-enriching activities.226 
Protection trusts may assist in integrated living by allowing purchases of items 
as simple as gifts for friends or as important as adaptive equipment, such as a 
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communication device, not covered by Medicaid.227 In addition, protection 
trusts address, to some extent, norms of the able-bodied that are woven into 
the Medicaid eligibility requirements. The government’s approval of 
protection trusts pushes back against the assumption that a person who has the 
use of assets does not require public assistance. In addition, by placing assets 
beyond the control of the individual with a disability, the protection trust 
addresses (albeit in a grossly paternalistic way) the assumption that Medicaid 
applicants are fully able to understand and independently comply with the law. 
Finally, the protection trust regime formalizes the government’s recognition of 
the role of family or friend relationships in the life of an individual with a 
disability, pushing back on the assumption of a stark dichotomy between 
dependent and independent living. 
Regardless of the superiority of a protection trust regime to one in which 
individuals with disabilities are permitted no asset protection, current law 
deviates substantially from a normative account of the provision of 
government-coordinated habilitative care to individuals with qualifying 
disabilities. Imagine once again the parents of Thomas, the infant with Down 
Syndrome. Because of their anticipation that Thomas may require access to 
habilitative care as an adult, they create a discretionary trust as part of their 
estate plan. The law, in essence, forces them to publicly express a desire to 
impoverish their son, requiring him to make claims on food assistance, public 
housing, and other government programs. His choices about what to eat, where 
to live, and how to get to work all will be limited by this fact. He will be 
saddled with the stigma that accompanies life as a comprehensive lifelong 
public claimant.228 Furthermore, as an adult, Thomas will be forced to ask 
permission from a trustee to use trust funds for discretionary expenses. If he 
wants to take a girlfriend out on a special date, purchase a movie collection 
that reminds him of his parents, or take a class on photography, he must seek 
the assent of another person as if he were still a child. No right-minded 
legislator would propose such a regime for children who are typically-abled. 
The parent of a typically-abled child may make such a choice, but the 
government would never mandate it. The fact that the law is so starkly 
different for individuals with significant disabilities indicates an embodiment 
in the law of assumptions about the nature of those with disabilities; namely, 
that they are childlike. There can be no question that the trust regime, which 
allows no support standard, grants absolute discretion to the trustee, and 
permits the adult beneficiary no independent judgment in ordinary matters of 
adult life, imposes dignitary harms on adults with qualifying disabilities. 
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The protection trust regime also fails on normative grounds because it 
impinges on autonomy and interferes in interpersonal relationships that have 
the potential to improve quality of life. In doing so, it imposes dignitary costs 
on individuals with disabilities. Where a protection trust is involved, an 
individual with a disability is literally unable to act independently. So while 
the use of protection trusts may appear to be autonomy increasing from an 
outsider’s perspective because trust funds allow a greater variety of personal 
expenditures, this may not be the perspective of an individual with a disability. 
Although the use of protection trusts may improve autonomy in cases where 
the trustee is a trusted friend who is truly guided by the choices of the 
individual with a disability, it militates against autonomy in cases where the 
trustee deviates from that individual’s preferences. Requiring the individual 
with a disability to request funds is, almost by definition, the opposite of 
autonomy. In addition, if the settlor of the trust is someone other than the 
beneficiary, and if that person wants the beneficiary to have some measure of 
independence, the settlor’s autonomy is also compromised by the current law. 
Another failure of the trust regime is that requiring the individual with a 
disability to request permission for discretionary expenditures embodies, in 
law, a message that the government (as a voice of collective society) does not 
believe that the individual is competent to handle his or her own affairs. While 
this may be true in some cases, enshrinement of this assumption in federal law 
makes little normative sense. Instead, to protect the dignity of individuals with 
disabilities, government should work from the premise that these individuals 
are competent to handle financial matters and let families, case workers, or 
guardians decide when this is not the case. Categorical relegation of 
individuals with disabilities on the basis of a characteristic that may not affect 
financial sophistication is an unduly restrictive approach. 
Yet another problem with the trust regime is that its prohibition on the use 
of a support standard imposes uncompensated emotional cost on the family 
members of individuals with disabilities. Stated more dryly, the protection 
trust regime interferes with interpersonal relationships between the individual 
with a disability and anyone who might be willing to provide financial 
assistance to that person, once again wrongly assuming, as does the Medicaid 
eligibility regime, that independent living is not consistent with interpersonal 
dependency. Think again of Thomas’s parents and the pain they must have felt 
when told that they would not be permitted to support their son in adulthood 
without jeopardizing his access to services that would permit him to live in the 
community instead of in an institution. Can we truly say that the emotional 
cost imposed by the government in this case is justified by the fact of 
Thomas’s disability? 
A final shortcoming of the trust regime is that imposing these costs only 
on a subset of individuals with significant disabilities may be conceived of as 
discriminatory because it places those individuals in an inferior position on the 
basis of their disabilities. To state it colloquially, imagine two children. One is 
gullible, or a criminal, or a substance abuser. The other has a developmental 
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disability. Both are beneficiaries of trusts settled by loving and concerned 
parents. The trust for the child with an addiction will contain a support 
standard requiring the trustee to see that the child has adequate shelter, 
clothing, and food. The trust for the child with the disability, by law, cannot, 
because if it does, the child will lose access to needed habilitative care. This 
discrepancy, which arises under law solely as a result of the second child’s 
disability, makes little sense. There simply is no reasoned connection between 
the need for coordinated habilitative care and the ability to pay for one’s own 
housing and food. 
V. THE ABLE ACT: A STEP FORWARD 
A. A Brief Description of the ABLE Act 
A better attempt to alleviate the adverse impact of Medicaid eligibility on 
individuals with intellectual or other qualifying disabilities is the Achieving a 
Better Life Experience Act, generally referred to as the ABLE Act.229 The 
ABLE Act creates a tax-preferred savings account under newly enacted 
section 529A of the Internal Revenue Code, similar to a college savings 
account.230 ABLE accounts may be created by the account beneficiary, or by 
the parent or legal guardian of a beneficiary who lacks capacity, and the 
account beneficiary must have a qualifying disability.231 Anyone can 
contribute to the account, so long as the contributions are made in cash or a 
cash equivalent.232 Contributions to the account, investment earnings inside of 
the account, and funds distributed for “qualified disability expenses” will not 
count against eligibility for means-tested federal programs, including 
Medicaid, except that distributions for housing expenses and account balances 
above $100,000 will reduce the beneficiary’s supplemental security income 
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(SSI) payment, if any.233 Each beneficiary may have only one account.234 Like 
college savings accounts, ABLE accounts are subject to an aggregate 
contribution limit pegged, strangely, to the cost of college tuition rather than 
any projection of the beneficiary’s disability-related expenses.235 In addition, 
yearly contributions to the account cannot exceed the annual gift tax 
exemption,236 which is $14,000 in 2015.237 Again, this amount bears no 
relation to an individual’s estimated yearly expenses, disability related or 
otherwise. 
Funds in an ABLE account may be used for “qualified disability 
expenses” without jeopardizing a beneficiary’s Medicaid eligibility.238 The 
definition of “qualified disability expenses” is broad and includes many of the 
everyday expenses that mark passage into adulthood, such as housing, 
transportation, and medical insurance.239 Specifically, the law provides that 
“qualified disability expenses” are expenses made for the benefit of an 
individual that are related to the individual’s disability.240 The law provides 
several categories of qualified expenses: education; housing; transportation; 
employment training and support; assistive technology and personal support 
services; health, prevention, and wellness; financial management and 
administrative services; legal fees; expenses for oversight and monitoring; 
funeral and burial expenses; and other expenses that are approved by the 
Secretary of the Treasury.241 Proposed regulations issued in June of 2015 
clarify that basic living expenses may be treated as qualified disability 
expenses.242 For example, the cost of a smart phone with navigation features is 
disability related.243 Funds that remain unused at the end of the beneficiary’s 
life are transferred to the state to reimburse it for assistance provided to the 
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beneficiary through Medicaid, but only up to the amount of that assistance.244 
This provision mirrors the Medicaid payback requirement found in some 
special needs trusts.245 
In addition to preserving a beneficiary’s eligibility for Medicaid and other 
programs, ABLE accounts subsidize qualified disability expenses through tax 
preference. ABLE account contributions and distributions receive preferential 
gift tax treatment.246 In addition, distributions for qualified disability expenses 
are not subject to federal income tax.247 On the other hand, distributions to a 
beneficiary for nonqualified expenses do not receive any income tax 
preference.248 Instead, they are taxed as annuity payments at a rate that is ten 
percent higher than the beneficiary’s usual rate.249 
Overall, the ABLE Act provides individuals with disabilities the 
opportunity to save money for necessary costs of adult living without 
jeopardizing access to the very disability-related services that they require for 
integration into the community. The ability to save, though, is hampered by 
yearly and aggregate contribution limits that unnecessarily limit the usefulness 
of ABLE accounts. In other words, the Act provides some relief, but that relief 
is incomplete. 
1. The ABLE Act: A Long Awaited (Partial) Solution 
The ABLE Act is normatively superior to the protection trust regime 
because it both increases autonomy and facilitates integrated living when it is 
desired and possible. First, and foremost, an individual with a disability who 
places funds in an ABLE account is not required to relinquish control over 
those funds but can withdraw them (subject to a tax penalty) if needed.250 This 
ability to reclaim funds differs markedly from the special needs trust regime, 
which requires beneficiaries to completely relinquish any claim or control over 
contributions, even if those contributions come from a beneficiary’s own wage 
income.251 Second, unlike assets held in a special needs trust, assets held in an 
ABLE account may be used for ordinary costs of living such as housing, 
insurance, and transportation.252 As a result, the beneficiary of an ABLE 
account is not constrained in his or her choices by restrictions and stigma that 
may be attached to government programs. In addition, it may be possible for 
an account owner or beneficiary to arrange direct payment to providers in a 
manner similar to college tuition, which would require the beneficiary to seek 
                                                                                                                     
 244 I.R.C. § 529A(f). 
 245 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 246 I.R.C. § 529A(c)(2). 
 247 Id. § 529A(c)(1)(B). 
 248 Id. § 529A(c)(1)(A). 
 249 Id. § 529A(c)(1)(A), (c)(3). 
 250 Id. (describing tax and ten percent penalty on non-disability-related distributions). 
 251 See supra Part IV.A.1.  
 252 I.R.C. § 529A(e)(5).  
1296 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:6 
permission fewer times and from fewer people.253 Under law, there is a tax 
penalty on disbursements made for nonqualified expenses, and nonqualified 
expenditures will count against the income and asset limitations of Medicaid, 
but enactment of the tax penalty makes it clear that a beneficiary may use the 
funds for nonqualifying expenditures. Broader permissible use of the funds 
and easier access to them will allow individuals with disabilities to more easily 
use funds in the way best suited to their individual needs and tastes. 
Another benefit of the ABLE account is that it can provide a form of 
income smoothing for Medicaid eligibility purposes when individuals with 
disabilities have earnings that follow a feast or famine model. The ability to 
remain eligible for benefits rather than drifting in and out of the system is 
important. Qualification for waiver services requires paperwork and often 
placement on a waiting list.254 Someone who is employable only in spurts may 
suffer from repeated disqualification from Medicaid and, therefore, also suffer 
from repeated application processes and waiting times. By allowing 
individuals with disabilities to save earnings and then use them over time for 
qualified expenses, ABLE accounts can provide income smoothing that will 
prevent repeated losses of Medicaid eligibility.255 This should forward 
integration and autonomy by preventing the disruption of an individual’s 
waiver services. 
In addition to forwarding traditional integrationist goals of autonomy and 
integration, the ABLE Act also addresses redistributive concerns raised by 
Francine Lipman and others by providing financial support in the form of a tax 
expenditure.256 Investment earnings inside of an ABLE account are exempt 
                                                                                                                     
 253 Many plans allow direct payments or online requests. For instance, Iowa has an 
online claim request process. See Withdrawals, C. SAVINGS IOWA, 
https://collegesavingsiowa.com/content/withdrawals.html [https://perma.cc/B466-JXGS]; 
see also FAQ: PA 529 Guaranteed Savings Plan, PA529, http://www.pa529.com/faqs/pa-
529-guaranteed-savings-plan/account-access [http://perma.cc/24AU-CRUQ]; How to Take 
Money Out of Your Direct Plan Account, NY’S 529 C. SAVINGS PROGRAM, 
https://www.nysaves.org/content/planbenefits_withdrawals.html [https://perma.cc/Q2KU-
C2NH]. 
 254 For a fifty-state chart on the length of waiver waitlists, see Waiting List Enrollment 
for Medicaid Section 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Services Waivers, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/waiting-lists-for-hcbs-waivers/ [http:// 
perma.cc/JM2N-JEVW].  
 255 The proposed regulations provide additional protection for individuals whose 
disability is sporadic. Proposed Treasury Regulation section 1.529A-2(d)(3) provides that 
an account will retain ABLE status even though an individual’s disability has ceased. 80 
Fed. Reg. 35,602, 35,613 (June 22, 2015). The account can accept no contributions during 
the cessation, and distributions made during that time are not made for qualified disability 
expenses. Id. 
 256 See Lipman, supra note 26, at 410 (arguing that post-integrationism calls for more 
aggressive redistribution of resources to individuals with disabilities). Under the traditional 
definition crafted by Stanley Surrey, tax expenditures are provisions that take the place of 
direct government spending and that deviate from generally accepted definitions of net 
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from federal income taxation unless and until they are distributed for 
nonqualified expenses or to a nonqualified beneficiary, and this foregone 
federal revenue will provide beneficiaries with additional money to spend on 
disability-related expenses.257 This is precisely the sort of cost-shifting 
envisioned by some post-integration disability law theorists.258 In addition, the 
ABLE Act moves away from a false dichotomy between dependent and 
independent living by interfering to a lesser degree with interpersonal financial 
relationships, and in doing so, it unwinds (to the extent of the contribution cap) 
perverse family financial and work planning incentives created by means 
testing. Returning to Thomas’s parents, there will be less reason to move 
assets into a special needs trust if they can instead be placed in an ABLE 
account, where they may be used to cover Thomas’s groceries, rent, and other 
expenses that cannot be covered through use of a special needs trust.259 ABLE 
accounts funded by family members and friends of individuals with disabilities 
will bring interpersonal financial relationships of individuals with disabilities 
closer to those experienced by their typically-abled counterparts. Accounts 
funded by individuals with disabilities from their own earnings will increase 
autonomy and self-direction.260 
Use of the accounts also should vitiate, to some extent, the waning yet 
widespread stereotype of individuals with waiver-qualifying disabilities as 
financial (or actual) wards of the state. This mischaracterization, which is 
embodied in the Medicaid eligibility requirements, forces individuals with 
disabilities to enter into a fuller relationship of dependence with the state than 
may be necessary. Stated more colloquially, typically-abled individuals in 
need of assistance may commonly look first to friends and family, and only 
when that fails, to the state. Means testing as a bar to access for disability-
related services prevents individuals with disabilities from benefitting from 
                                                                                                                     
income. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 3 (1973). They may include 
exemptions, deductions, credits, and exclusions. Id. 
 257 I.R.C. § 529A(a), (c) (accounts are exempt from tax; nonqualified distributions are 
subject to tax and a penalty). 
 258 See Weber, supra note 26, at 891 (“[Post-integration theorists] have written of new 
ideas of social justice that take into account the realities of disability—for example, the 
inevitable costs that disability imposes on the individual by reducing earning capacity and 
increasing necessary expenses. They have proposed shifting those costs onto society as a 
whole.” (footnote omitted)). 
 259 See I.R.C. § 529A(e)(5) (description of disability related expenses). In addition, 
distributions from the account could be used to for transportation expenses such as to 
purchase a vehicle, make necessary modifications to it, or to cover the cost of other options 
such as mass transit or a taxi. Id. Distributions from the account could also cover the cost 
of financial management, legal fees, personal assistance, job training, education, and 
funeral expenses. Id. 
 260 See ABLE Hearing, supra note 180, at 31 (prepared statement of Chase A. Phillips, 
Financial Advisor and Advocate) (“This account will serve as a self-sufficient booster for 
disabled individuals to live independently, go to college, get married, and start a family. No 
longer would an individual have to decline a higher paying salary for fear that their assets 
would eclipse the $2,000 asset limit.”).  
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similar relational dependence. Placing an artificial barrier between individuals 
with disabilities and their loved ones likely affects not only the transfer of 
funds but also the emotional health of the parties involved, imposing 
intangible costs on both the individual with a disability and those who want to 
assist him. But there seems to be no logical connection between imposition of 
this cost and the presence of a disability. The presence of a disability does not 
provide a line of demarcation that would justify government intrusion into 
preferred relationships of dependency. Rather, both avenues of resort—support 
of a social and familial network and support of the government—should be 
equally available, just as they are equally available to typically-abled 
individuals. The ABLE Act allows family and friends to contribute and allows 
beneficiaries to use those contributions for everyday expenses of adult life. As 
such, it is an improvement over the special needs trust regime because it 
recognizes and does not delegitimize natural relationships of dependency and 
support.261 
Of equal importance, the ABLE Act preserves dignity and improves 
employment opportunities of individuals with qualifying disabilities. Prior to 
passage of the ABLE Act, individuals with disabilities had three choices if 
their potential earnings would bar them from receiving waiver services. First, 
they could forego government-provided services in favor of private ones. This 
may be a viable option for some people, but for many, many others, 
government coordination of services is important.262 In addition, private 
services are difficult to obtain,263 are unaffordable,264 and typically are not 
covered by private health insurance.265 Second, a person whose income was 
above the Medicaid limit could contribute her excess earnings to a Medicaid 
payback trust. This option is suboptimal because the individual must cede 
complete control of her earnings to a trustee vested with absolute discretion.266 
                                                                                                                     
 261 See I.R.C. § 529A(b) (no restrictions on identity of account contributors); id. 
§ 529A(e)(5) (description of disability-related expenses). 
 262 Case managers, who are typically not available with privately purchased care, 
assess an individual’s needs, develop a plan for meeting those needs, coordinate care 
among multiple providers, link individuals with disabilities to other relevant federal and 
state programs, monitor the delivery of care and address problems with it, and responds to 
crisis situations. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS), APPLICATION FOR A 
§ 1915(c) HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVER: INSTRUCTIONS, TECHNICAL GUIDE AND 
REVIEW CRITERIA 113–14, 141–42 (Ver. 3.5, Jan. 2015) [hereinafter HCBS 
INSTRUCTIONS], http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/ 
waivers/downloads/technical-guidance.pdf [http://perma.cc/7SCH-344L] (stating that 
coordinating care enables the state to set the standard for training and maintain a high level 
of care from all providers). 
 263 2010 FINDS SURVEY, supra note 86, at iv (finding that more than 80% of families 
had difficulty finding care providers). 
 264 Id. at 24 (finding that 80% of families reported having insufficient funds to cover 
the costs of care). 
 265 Id. at 12 (finding that only 8% of families reported private insurance coverage of 
costs of care paid to unrelated parties). 
 266 See supra Part IV.A. (describing Medicaid protection trusts). 
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The trustee could choose never to make a distribution, and the beneficiary 
whose earnings are tied up would have no legal recourse. Furthermore, money 
in the trust cannot be used for important expenses of adult living like food and 
rent. Finally, an individual with earnings potential in excess of the Medicaid 
limit may decide to work fewer hours in order to preserve eligibility for 
disability-related services.267 For example, consider testimony before the 
Senate Finance Committee of Sara Wolff, a woman who happens to have 
Down Syndrome: 
Currently, I cannot have more than two-thousand dollars in assets before 
the government aid that I need is cut off. In this day and age, two-thousand 
dollars is not a lot of money and with the rising costs of housing, 
transportation and medical assistance that I need, it is tough for me to be able 
to save. I currently work two part-time jobs, and my employers have been 
gracious enough to work with me so I do not earn more than seven-hundred 
dollars a month; and maintain my government benefits.268 
Because employers may be unwilling to enter into very limited part-time 
arrangements and would prefer to hire individuals who have fewer scheduling 
restrictions, the Medicaid income and asset limitations may unduly limit 
employment opportunities for individuals who need government-coordinated 
habilitative care. Passage of the ABLE Act should alleviate this problem to an 
extent (although contribution caps make it a less-than-perfect fix). 
The ABLE Act is, however, an incomplete solution. Like special needs 
trusts, it relies on private actors for its implementation, and not all individuals 
with disabilities will have either the capability or the outside assistance needed 
to access the law. It also requires segregation of finances under special rules 
that disempower beneficiaries with disabilities. In addition, contributions to 
the account are limited, which means that its ability to address perverse 
incentives created by current law is similarly limited. Furthermore, 
contribution limitations applicable to ABLE accounts seemingly bear no 
relationship to an individual’s projected or actual disability-related expenses. 
So while the ABLE Act is a clear improvement over prior law, it is not 
normatively optimal. Congress and the states should take the next step and 
eliminate the means testing for waiver services. 
2. Normative Weaknesses of the ABLE Act 
There are three substantive problems with the ABLE Act. One of them—
its contribution limit—is more pragmatic in nature, while the other two—lack 
of access for lower income or financially unsophisticated families and lack of 
self-administration by the individual with a disability—raise normative 
                                                                                                                     
 267 ABLE Hearing, supra note 180, at 34 (prepared statement of Sara C. Wolff, Self-
Advocate & Board Member, National Down Syndrome Society (NDSS)). 
 268 Id. (emphasis added). 
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concerns about the equitable distribution of resources in society and about 
dignity of the person. This is not to say that the ABLE Act is not, at the very 
least, a partial solution to the problems raised by means testing. Rather, the 
ABLE Act is a good start, but it is incomplete. Congress should go further. 
a. Contribution Limits Measured by College Tuition Make No Sense In 
this Context 
The first and most obvious flaw of the ABLE account is that its 
contribution limits bear no relationship to the actual qualified disability 
expenses that an individual might incur. Artificially low contribution limits 
may prevent account beneficiaries from fully covering disability-related 
expenses using account funds, may prevent them from saving for retirement, 
and may prevent families from contributing to support in ways that could 
lessen a beneficiary’s dependence on non-disability-related government 
programs. And while Congress may have imposed contribution limits to 
control the amount of tax benefit provided under the act, it could have chosen 
to cap the tax benefit directly rather than limiting contributions to the account. 
Two contribution limits apply to ABLE accounts. First, yearly 
contributions to the account may not exceed the gift tax exemption amount in 
effect under Internal Revenue Code section 2503(b) for any given year.269 In 
2015, that amount is $14,000.270 This amount bears no relationship to an 
individual’s projected or actual qualified disability expenses. In many cities, 
the account beneficiary might spend close to this amount on rent alone. 
Because the amount is artificially low, it will prevent individuals with 
disabilities who may be capable of saving for disability-related expenses in 
retirement from actually doing so. Not only might this result in financial 
insecurity and dignitary harm to the account beneficiary, but it almost 
guarantees that the account beneficiary will be a claimant of government 
programs in retirement. Congress appears not to have considered these costs 
when choosing the gift tax exemption amount as an annual contribution cap. In 
fact, its choice demonstrates that gifts, and not earned income, were of primary 
concern when writing this portion of the legislation. Otherwise, it would have 
chosen some combination of estimated and/or actual disability-related 
expenses. 
The $14,000 limitation also makes no sense in the context of contributions 
from family members and friends. Not only is it unrelated to any reasonable 
estimate of disability-related expenses, but it also precludes testamentary 
transfers. Imagine again Thomas’s family, but in a scenario where their assets 
are illiquid. They have a house and vehicles. When they die, these assets could 
be sold and the proceeds used to cover Thomas’s disability-related expenses, 
including housing, transportation, and food. Doing so would lessen his 
                                                                                                                     
 269 ABLE Act of 2014, I.R.C. § 529A(b)(2) (West Supp. 2015).  
 270 Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860. 
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dependence on related government programs and give his parents the 
satisfaction of knowing that they had provided for him, at least in part. Instead, 
the ABLE Act prohibits a lump sum contribution, so Thomas’s parents will 
direct the money to a special needs trust instead. The special needs trust will 
limit use of the funds to discretionary expenses not otherwise covered by the 
government. Thomas will be able to use the bequest to buy movie tickets and 
haircuts, but he will not be able to use it for rent. This problem could be easily 
solved by allowing testamentary transfers to ABLE accounts, a quick fix with 
low potential for abuse. 
In addition to imposing a yearly contribution limit, the ABLE Act also 
imposes an aggregate contribution limit. It specifies that contributions over the 
life of the account cannot exceed “the limit established by the State under 
section 529(b)(6).”271 Under section 529, which describes college savings 
accounts, states must provide “adequate safeguards to prevent contributions on 
behalf of a designated beneficiary in excess of those necessary to provide for 
the qualified higher education expenses of the beneficiary.”272 Consequently, 
states have set contribution limits based on the costs of tuition, room and 
board, books, and other educational expenses.273 In addition, the Treasury 
Regulations provide a safe harbor contribution amount based on “five years of 
undergraduate enrollment at the highest cost institution allowed by the 
program.”274 There is no reason to believe that this amount will bear any 
relationship to the amount of money needed to support the lifetime “qualified 
disability expenses” of an ABLE account beneficiary. 
Congress could easily correct the discrepancy between its seemingly 
random contribution limit and the amount of qualified disability expenses that 
an individual might incur over a lifetime. For instance, Congress could amend 
section 529A to allow contributions up to the amount of disability-related 
distributions during the year plus an amount deemed reasonable for retirement 
savings, like the tax-preferred IRA contribution limit in effect for the year. 
Amending the law in this way would allow individuals with disabilities to 
cover more expenses from their own wages while still allowing them to save 
for those expenses in retirement. Alternatively, and perhaps more easily 
implemented, Congress could simply remove contribution limits and cap the 
available tax benefit instead. 
An aggregate contribution limit pegged to the cost of education raises a 
second very troubling problem. Congress seems to have assumed that ABLE 
                                                                                                                     
 271 See I.R.C. § 529A(b)(6).  
 272 Id. § 529(b)(6). 
 273 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200134032 (May 30, 2001) (approving maximum 
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 274 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-2(i)(2), 63 Fed. Reg. 45,019, 45,028 (Aug. 24, 1998). 
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account beneficiaries will not have both disability related expenses and 
qualified education expenses. Consider, for instance, Jane and Joe. Jane is 
typically-abled, but Joe happens to have a waiver-qualifying disability arising 
from cerebral palsy. As a result, he could benefit from disability-related 
services. Both are the owners of fully funded tax-preferred savings accounts, 
and both choose to attend the same private college. Both completely exhaust 
their account balance on tuition and other educational expenses. Jane’s 
account is a college savings account under section 529, but Joe’s is an ABLE 
account under section 529A. (He cannot own a regular 529 college savings 
account because they are countable resources for purposes of determining 
Medicaid eligibility.)275 While Jane will need no extraordinary assistance to 
enter the workforce and participate independently in her community, Joe will 
require monetary and habilitative support to remain independent. 
Unfortunately, the balance of his ABLE account will have been exhausted; 
means testing of Medicaid eligibility will prevent him from seeking a fair 
wage; and his family will be unable to assist him further without jeopardizing 
his access to habilitative care through Medicaid. 
One possible explanation for the disparate treatment of Jane and Joe 
centers on misplaced concerns about horizontal equity—the idea that similarly 
situated taxpayers should bear and receive similar portions of the burdens and 
benefits of government.276 Applying college savings account contribution 
limits to ABLE accounts might be seen as an attempt to create parity between 
individuals with disabilities and those without. Individuals with disabilities, 
the argument may run, are currently at a disadvantage because they cannot 
create savings accounts for their future benefit without jeopardizing their 
Medicaid status. In other words, the law provides a financial advantage to Jane 
that is not currently provided to Joe, making his position subordinate to hers 
purely on the basis of his disability. To cure this slight, the ABLE Act grants 
to Joe the same benefit that is granted to Jane. Using this logic, the same 
contribution limit should apply to both forms of tax-preferred savings. 
A parity-based argument in support of contribution limits is misguided in 
this context, though, because the two groups of beneficiaries are not similarly 
situated. Jane will not need lifelong access to habilitative care, while Joe will. 
To create true parity, Congress could simply have provided that a college 
savings account would not be considered an asset of its owner for Medicaid 
purposes (and, in the author’s opinion, it should do so). Jane and Joe could 
then pay for their own college expenses on equal terms. But this would not 
achieve the goal of the ABLE Act. The purpose of the ABLE account is 
entirely different from the purpose of the college savings account. The stated 
purpose of the ABLE Act is “supporting individuals with disabilities to 
                                                                                                                     
 275 POMS, supra note 135, at SI 01140.150 (Oct. 2009), http://policy.ssa.gov/ 
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THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 59–60 (4th ed. 2008) (defining vertical and horizontal equity for 
purposes of tax policy). 
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maintain health, independence, and quality of life.”277 The legislation clarifies 
that it is meant to “supplement, but not supplant,” benefits provided by the 
government.278 In other words, it is meant to facilitate private support of 
individuals with disabilities without jeopardizing their access to Medicaid. In 
contrast, the college savings account was created to help families pay tuition. 
It is clear that the two accounts forward different goals. As a result, the 
concept of horizontal equity is inapposite as a justification for the ABLE 
account contribution limit. 
Congress should carve college savings accounts out of the Medicaid 
eligibility calculation. The example of Jane and Joe demonstrates that as a 
result of embodiment of the longstanding norm of exclusion of individuals 
with qualifying disabilities from higher education, Joe’s position is 
subordinate to Jane’s. But this norm is giving way to the reality of increased 
educational opportunities for individuals with intellectual and developmental 
disabilities,279 and in the recent FINDS survey, over fifty-eight percent of 
family caregivers reported that it was very important for their loved ones with 
intellectual or developmental disabilities to continue their education after high 
school.280 To create true parity, Joe should be permitted ownership of both the 
college savings account and the ABLE account without jeopardizing his 
access to waiver services. 
The disparate treatment of Jane and Joe is perhaps mitigated by the fact 
that although Joe cannot own a college savings account, he can be the 
beneficiary of one.281 Of course, his potential status as a beneficiary of a 
college savings account makes Congress’s choice of the section 529 aggregate 
account limitation even more bizarre. Finally, notice the dignitary harm 
present here. Joe can benefit from a college saving account, but only if he does 
not create or own it. Because Joe has a disability, the law forces him to trade 
ownership and control (i.e., self-determination and independence) for the very 
services that he needs to remain independent in the community. 
A second possible justification for aggregate and annual contribution 
limits may be Congress’s desire to avoid tax sheltering. Although 
contributions to ABLE accounts are not federally deductible, investment 
earnings inside of the account are exempt from tax.282 Distributions for 
                                                                                                                     
 277 See ABLE Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 101, 128 Stat. 4056, 4056 (codified 
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qualified disability expenses are also exempt.283 In addition, the owner of the 
account may change the beneficiary designation without incurring any tax if 
the new beneficiary is a member of the original beneficiary’s family who also 
has a qualifying disability.284 If contributions to ABLE accounts were 
unlimited, permissive tax treatment might enable wealthy families to shelter 
investment earnings from tax, allowing them to accumulate in the ABLE 
account for the duration of the beneficiary’s life. This problem could be solved 
easily, though, by capping the maximum tax benefit available in a year or over 
the lifetime of the account rather than by capping contributions. Furthermore, 
the presence of Medicaid payback language in the ABLE Act is likely to 
discourage families from contributing more money to an ABLE account than a 
beneficiary might actually use. Because the potential for sheltering is low and 
easily dealt with in other ways, Congress should repeal the annual and 
aggregate contribution limits currently applicable to ABLE accounts. 
b. Placing the ABLE Account in the Internal Revenue Code Restricts 
Access but May Produce Structural Gains. 
A second problem with the ABLE account—its inclusion in the Internal 
Revenue Code—raises normative concerns about equity and equal access. 
First, limiting availability of benefits to taxpayers who are able to save (i.e., 
have disposable income) creates disparities across socioeconomic strata. 
Beneficiaries who are able to save more will have more untaxed investment 
earnings inside of their ABLE accounts. Greater earnings will provide them 
with both greater tax benefit and greater purchasing power. And it is likely that 
beneficiaries who are able to save more are either more able-bodied and 
therefore able to earn higher wages than their low-savings counterparts, or, 
alternatively, they come from wealthier families than their low-savings 
counterparts. 
Those with low or no income may realize little or no benefit from the 
ABLE Act due to a combination of lower marginal tax rates and income 
uncertainty, whereas those at higher levels will benefit from both tax 
subsidization and easier access to waiver services. Deborah Schenk and 
Andrew Grossman have demonstrated that “[a]s with the other tax incentives, 
taxpayers with no tax liability cannot benefit from the use of a 529.”285 In 
addition, they observe that the return on savings in a 529 account must 
compete not only with other reasons for saving, “such as for a house or car, 
but also must compete with day-to-day consumption. The utility from savings 
simply cannot compete with the utility from essential expenditures.”286 This is 
also true in the ABLE Act context. Families who earn no more than is needed 
                                                                                                                     
 283 Id. § 529A(c) (distributions for qualified disability expenses are not subject to tax). 
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to cover essential expenses will be excluded from participation in the ABLE 
structure and instead will have to rely on estate planning options such as 
special needs trusts to protect Medicaid eligibility of heirs who are individuals 
with disabilities. 
Inclusion of the ABLE Act in the Internal Revenue Code may also create 
complexity that could bar access by less sophisticated taxpayers. As Anne 
Alstott has noted with regard to the earned income tax credit, “the traditional 
tax policy goal of exempting the poor from income taxation” not only means 
that families at low income will realize no tax benefit but also will be less 
likely to participate overall.287 Lower participation may occur in the context of 
the ABLE Act because a taxpayer may be reticent to work with a bank, may be 
reluctant to place money under even nominal state control, may not know 
about the ABLE Act or be able to understand it, or simply may lack disposable 
income. 
Some commentators also have suggested that moving social safety net 
programs into the Internal Revenue Code may reduce aggregate complexity by 
shifting them into a more efficient wing of the overall bureaucracy, but this 
argument is inapposite in the case of the ABLE Act, which layers a new 
program on top of an existing one.288 In other words, an ABLE Act 
beneficiary cannot avoid the state’s Medicaid administration bureaucracy 
through use of the account. The beneficiary still must apply and be approved 
for Medicaid in order to receive waiver services (although perhaps he will 
experience some bureaucratic relief through avoidance of other welfare-related 
agencies if he substitutes ABLE account funds for government benefits such 
as housing assistance). 
It is possible, though, that concerns about inclusion of the ABLE Act in 
the Internal Revenue Code are offset by gains that may accompany the 
enactment of nontax provisions in the tax code. For instance, Susannah Camic 
Tahk has noted that provisions are easier to enact if they are included in the 
tax code because lower procedural hurdles apply to tax legislation.289 In 
addition, “tax-embedded programs are situated in a web of tax law that makes 
them hard to excise cleanly.”290 As a result, they are less likely to be repealed 
than programs that may be legislated in a more free-standing fashion.291 Social 
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Transformation of U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 81–92 (2013) (describing 
the relative ease of procedures applicable to tax legislation). 
 290 Id. at 88. 
 291 Id. at 90 n.157. 
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programs housed in the tax code also expand and contract automatically over 
time as the number of claimants filing returns waxes and wanes.292 In contrast, 
direct spending programs generally require Congressional action for 
expansion.293 
Benefits may also arise from redundancy.294 Nancy Staudt has observed 
that “[r]edundancy in effort and control can provide a measure of reliability in 
the face of uncertainty.”295 In addition, redundancy may spark competition and 
innovation among administrators.296 This certainly may be the case with 
regard to the ABLE Act, which allows the Internal Revenue Service to 
determine which expenses are qualified disability expenses, perhaps in 
contravention to the determination of some states as to whether assets or 
services purchased for an individual with a disability may constitute countable 
income or assets. 
In the end, while there are legitimate arguments in favor of crafting the 
ABLE Act as a tax provision, it would be normatively superior to simply 
eliminate means testing as a bar to accessing government-coordinated 
habilitative care. Elimination of means-tested access to waiver services would 
eliminate the need for redundancy in income and asset determinations for 
some claimants, as these would no longer be relevant to eligibility. Second, it 
would eliminate distributional concerns raised by the ABLE Act’s status as a 
tax expenditure for families with disposable incomes. Although some may 
argue that granting non-means-tested waivers would create a second 
distributional concern by unduly redistributing to the wealthy, that argument is 
normatively and pragmatically unfounded. If we assume, realistically, that 
wealthier families of individuals with disabilities will successfully shelter 
assets with or without an ABLE account (in other words, because they have 
access to sophisticated legal counsel, individuals with disabilities from 
wealthy backgrounds will always qualify for waiver services), removal of 
means testing will not directly affect the overall distribution of waiver 
resources. The number of wealthy claimants will not change. For them, the 
question is not whether they will have access, but whether the government will 
continue to demand dignitary and emotional sacrifices as the cost of access. 
So, to summarize, the ABLE Act’s redistributive feature—the provision of a 
tax benefit solely to families with disposable income—raises normative 
concerns that would be more fully addressed by the removal of means testing, 
and structural gains from inclusion of the ABLE Act in the Internal Revenue 
Code may be outweighed by normative losses related to distributive justice. 
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c. Dignitary Concerns 
A third set of concerns raised by the ABLE Act regard the dignity of the 
beneficiary with a disability. With the ABLE Act, Congress has, in theory 
recognized the needs of individuals with disabilities both to earn a wage and to 
receive social supports that will enable integrated living. And yet, the ABLE 
account requires a beneficiary to hand her wages over to a manager who will 
give them back only upon request. Furthermore, only some of the 
beneficiary’s expenses will receive the government’s imprimatur. Although 
this structure was undoubtedly designed to control the ABLE Act’s tax 
expenditure side, it nonetheless relies on assumptions about disability rather 
than starting from the premise that individuals with disabilities are individuals 
first. 
One example of harm to dignity comes from the need of an account 
beneficiary to repeatedly interact with the state with regard to her 
expenditures. Repeated interaction with a trustee differs markedly from the 
way in which an adult ordinarily would spend money. In addition to creating 
transactional costs, it imposes dignitary harm by placing all adults with 
qualifying disabilities in a subjugated position when only some need intensive 
financial intervention, which could be provided through normal channels like 
guardianship or protective trust. In addition, the requirement of repeated 
interaction with a trustee may impose financial costs in the form of lost 
opportunity. For example, a beneficiary who has limited borrowing power and 
limited funds outside of the account may not be able to take advantage of 
something like a special one-day sale price on an expensive item because her 
interaction with the trustee simply will not be fast enough. In short, forcing 
individuals with disabilities into segregated disability-only trust or account 
planning subjects them to paternalism on the basis of a characteristic that is 
not always determinative of the need for paternalism. A far less intrusive 
means of safeguarding access to government-coordinated habilitative care 
would be to simply make it available to everyone regardless of income or asset 
holding. 
A final dignitary concern arising from the ABLE Act stems from law’s 
function as a repository of social norms. The inclusion of the ABLE Act as a 
corollary to section 529, a section of the Internal Revenue Code meant to help 
families pay for their children’s education, suggests that we view individuals 
with waiver-qualifying disabilities as childlike. In fact, adults with significant 
disabilities may choose to establish their own ABLE accounts to serve as 
repositories for wages earned. Formalization of the longstanding cliché of the 
individual with a developmental disability as childlike imposes a moral cost on 
society. It creates a collective relegation of adults of diverse abilities and 
backgrounds to a group of people—juveniles—that, by definition, are unable 
to adequately navigate the financial responsibilities of adult life. And while 
some, or many, adults with qualifying disabilities may not fit comfortably 
within the norms established for adulthood by typically-abled society, 
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formalization of the stereotype of individuals with disabilities as juveniles 
grants federal imprimatur to society’s collective discomfort with disability 
and, in particular, intellectual disability. 
VI. REMOVAL OF MEANS TESTING FOR WAIVER SERVICES IS 
NORMATIVELY SUPERIOR TO ABLE ACCOUNTS OR ASSET PROTECTION 
TRUSTS 
The distributional and dignitary concerns raised by asset protection trusts 
and ABLE accounts could be eliminated if Congress and the states simply 
ended means testing for access to waiver services. Unlike prior solutions that 
rely on the participation and funding of private actors, the elimination of 
means testing is a public solution available to all. Elimination of means testing 
would be a superior solution from a normative standpoint because it would 
preserve autonomy, facilitate integration to the fullest extent desired or 
possible, remove perverse incentives in family financial planning, and work 
around norms of the typically-abled that are embedded in Medicaid eligibility 
rules. 
A. Normative Considerations Favor Removal of Means Testing 
1. Increased Autonomy 
Allowing individuals with disabilities to access waiver services regardless 
of ability to pay protects autonomy by allowing those individuals to have 
control, to the extent that they are able, over their own finances. In contrast, a 
legal system that relies solely on the special needs trust and ABLE account 
intrudes upon individuals’ decision-making and requires them to rely on third 
parties for distributions of their own funds.297 Even typical support trusts 
(which are currently countable assets for purposes of Medicaid) are less 
draconian than special needs trusts because the trustee is, at the very least, 
required to make distributions for support and maintenance of the 
beneficiary.298 Unlike the beneficiaries of support trusts, beneficiaries of 
special needs trusts may be forced to become claimants of stigmatized 
government programs, such as housing and food assistance, which are 
                                                                                                                     
 297 See Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 108 (describing how a trustee has “complete 
discretion to decide when and how to distribute income and principal or to withhold 
distributions completely”). 
 298 See William H. Lyons & John M. Gradwohl, Discretionary Trusts, Support Trusts, 
Discretionary Support Trusts, Spendthrift Trusts, and Special Needs Trusts Under the 
Nebraska Uniform Trust Code, 86 NEB. L. REV. 231, 238 (2007) (describing support trusts 
and observing that “a support trust would give a trustee discretion to make payments for 
the ‘support and maintenance’ of the beneficiary”). 
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completely unrelated to disability services.299 In addition, the personal choices 
of individuals with disabilities regarding fundamental life decisions, such as 
what to eat and where to live, must be made with reference to government 
strictures and in some cases will be stalled by government bureaucracy. ABLE 
accounts improve this situation somewhat because they lessen the degree to 
which waiver recipients must claim social supports unrelated to disability, but 
the ABLE Act still has a contribution cap and limits the ways in which 
individuals can spend funds.300 Removal of means testing would address these 
problems. 
2. Less Reliance on Norms of the Able-Bodied 
Removal of means testing also reduces government reliance on norms of 
the typically-abled that are embedded in the Medicaid eligibility rules. The 
practice of denying Medicaid access to individuals with sufficient income 
likely arises from the assumption that these individuals are able-bodied enough 
for regular employment. Regular employment may signal access to employer-
provided health insurance, or sufficient resources to purchase health insurance 
on the private market. In the case of individuals with qualifying disabilities, 
one or both of these assumptions are likely to fail. The first assumption—that 
an individual with income is able-bodied enough for regular employment—
fails to account for the importance of habilitative services in the continued 
employment of individuals with disabilities. To take the analysis a step further, 
the rules assume that work is a necessary precondition to income, which may 
not be the case. The second assumption—that a person with sufficient 
resources can purchase assistance on the private market—is faulty in at least 
three ways. First, the income and asset limitations applicable to Medicaid 
eligibility are very low, so there is likely a vast raft of individuals who are not 
poor enough to qualify for Medicaid but are too poor to purchase disability-
related services outside of Medicaid. Second, it may be difficult for someone 
with a qualifying disability to coordinate her own care, whereas a waiver 
program generally provides some modicum of central coordination.301 Third, 
correctness of the assumption depends on the existence of a robust private 
                                                                                                                     
 299 See Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 108 (describing how a trustee has “complete 
discretion to decide when and how to distribute income and principal or to withhold 
distributions completely”). 
 300 See supra Part V.A. Nonqualified expenditures of a waiver claimant made with 
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ABLE Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 103, 128 Stat. 4056, 4063 (stating that “any 
amount (including earnings thereon) in the ABLE account (within the meaning of section 
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determining eligibility for federal benefits). 
 301 Because the waiver is administered by a state agency, there will be a case worker of 
some sort at the very least. 
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market, but the relatively small number of individuals with significant 
disabilities, in combination with the prevalence of government in the 
coordination of and payment for habilitative care, may preclude the 
development of such a market. Put more plainly, because governments are so 
heavily involved in coordinating care for a relatively small population, it may 
be difficult to find nongovernmental providers who work in a coordinated 
fashion. If most people seek care through government coordination, the private 
market may be hobbled by its use of the government as a middleman. If access 
to the private market for care is underdeveloped, access to disability-related 
services through Medicaid is crucial (and perhaps allowing an income 
insensitive buy-in would lead to increased service capacity and options in 
communities). Finally, removal of means testing for access to waiver services 
is normatively superior because it prevents assumptions about ability, income, 
and access from affecting Medicaid eligibility of individuals with disabilities. 
Removal of means testing also addresses the embodiment in Medicaid 
eligibility requirements of a false dichotomy between dependent and 
independent living. Current law embraces the cultural assumption that adult 
financial independence equates to an ability to live independently. It penalizes 
individuals with disabilities who have resources by withdrawing needed 
disability-related services. But the equation is false. Possession of resources 
does not connote an ability to find and privately purchase those disability-
related services needed for community living.302 In other words, financial need 
and dependence upon disability-related services need not be correlated. 
Family dependence also creates difficulty for an individual who wishes to 
remain Medicaid eligible. The law penalizes in-kind gifts from family 
members or friends when they stand in for something that could have been 
provided by government assistance.303 In other words, the law punishes adults 
with disabilities who enter into relationships of dependency with family and 
friends. In contrast, it rewards those who replace dependence on family and 
friends with dependence on the government. By placing severe financial 
restrictions on access to disability-related services, the government is 
unintentionally engaging in financial custodialism. In doing so, it perversely 
incentivizes family and friends of an individual with a qualifying disability to 
forego financial assistance that could be autonomy-preserving for both the 
person providing support and the person receiving it. This, in turn, limits the 
life choices of the individual with a disability. 
3. Potential for Cost Savings 
From a more pragmatic and utilitarian perspective, eliminating means 
testing for waiver services also may be cost effective and utility-increasing. 
                                                                                                                     
 302 Gifts of cash or gifts in kind of items that could have been covered by government 
assistance are counted against income limitation. 
 303 Id. 
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One source of cost savings may result from increased competitive employment 
of individuals with significant disabilities. Susan Stefan has written that while 
increasing employment-related services is “cost-intensive at the front end,” 
supported employment programs provide a net benefit to taxpayers in the form 
of taxes paid by individuals with disabilities beginning in the fourth year of the 
program.304 In addition, integrated living has been linked to better health 
outcomes and a reduction in healthcare costs.305 Additional tax revenue and 
healthcare savings could offset some or all of the cost of providing 
government-coordinated habilitative care to individuals with significant 
disabilities without regard to income. 
Another form of savings may arise to the extent that individuals with 
disabilities are willing and able to substitute private support for government 
support. Consider, one final time, Thomas and his parents. Although they do 
not have disposable income for ABLE account contributions, they could leave 
a portion of their assets to Thomas through their wills. Let us assume that as an 
adult, Thomas has no objection to receiving family support (one can imagine 
objections based on dignity and autonomy in some cases). Put more plainly, 
both they and he would prefer to avoid public housing, food stamps, and other 
interactions with bureaucracy that may be unpleasant and stigmatizing.306 
Because current law continues to rely heavily on trust planning, if Thomas 
hopes to preserve his access to government-coordinated habilitative care, he 
may be forced to choose government dependence. His choice will impose an 
unnecessary cost on taxpayers in the form of food and housing assistance, 
even though that assistance is unwanted. With the removal of means testing, 
however, Thomas is not forced to make this choice. Instead, he may choose to 
receive waiver services and decline other forms of public assistance. This 
choice is utility-increasing for Thomas and his family because it satisfies their 
preferences. In addition, it prevents the infliction of emotional harm on 
Thomas’s parents, who otherwise would be forced to disinherit him in his 
infancy. Finally, the situation is pragmatically superior because it prevents the 
expenditure of scarce government resources on goods and services that are 
unwanted by the recipient. 
Of course, the extent to which utility is increased and cost is reduced as a 
result of voluntary relinquishment of offered benefits depends on the 
                                                                                                                     
 304 Susan Stefan, Beyond Residential Segregation: The Application of Olmstead to 
Segregated Employment Settings, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 875, 933 (2010). 
 305 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Disability Cliff, 35 DEMOCRACY J. 55, 66 (2015) 
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disability “tend to be a marker of powerlessness and shame”). 
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soundness of two assumptions. First, it assumes that individuals with 
disabilities are not averse to waiving their entitlement to government 
assistance in favor of private support. Second, it assumes that family and 
friends of individuals with disabilities are willing and able to provide such 
support, but are unable to settle ABLE accounts with disposable income (not 
an unfair assumption given the cost of caring for a family member with a 
disability). The soundness of these assumptions presents an empirical question 
on which no research has yet been done. I hope that this Article will provide a 
basis for such future research. 
4. Parity Among Families 
Finally, provision of waiver services regardless of income or asset holding 
is autonomy-maximizing for the families of individuals with disabilities, and it 
creates parity for estate planning purposes between these families and families 
whose children are all typically-abled. Like most parents, those of a child with 
a significant disability want to secure the child’s financial future to the greatest 
extent possible. The family of a typically-abled child may do this by creating a 
college savings account for the child, naming the child as the beneficiary of 
retirement accounts or life insurance policies, or leaving a bequest of property, 
such as the family home or savings. Families may not do this for a child who 
will require government-coordinated habilitative care.307 For example, 
consider a family in which one child is typically-abled and another has autism. 
If the family hopes to preserve waiver eligibility of the child with autism, it 
must treat the two children differently. One will be named in the parents’ will, 
and the other will be disinherited. Forcing parents to face this moral 
dilemma—should they disinherit one child while favoring the other, 
particularly when that other is far more likely to need support—imposes an 
emotional cost on the parents solely on the basis of a child’s disability. In this 
situation, parental autonomy is diminished, as is the future autonomy of the 
child. The family is forced to push the child’s future adult self into stigmatized 
public support programs in order to preserve access to waiver services, and 
that future adult will exercise no control over spending decisions. If waiver 
eligibility were not affected by income and asset holding, however, the 
autonomy of the family members and the child would be maximized. The 
parents could choose a run-of-the-mill support trust, an outright gift to the 
child, or even intestate succession without jeopardizing the child’s waiver 
access. In this scenario, the family’s options for planning with regard to the 
typically-abled child and the child with a disability are identical. This, as one 
father described to the Senate Finance Committee, “is about fairness.”308 He 
added, 
                                                                                                                     
 307 See supra Part III.C (describing income and asset holding restrictions on Medicaid 
eligibility).  
 308 ABLE Hearing, supra note 180, at 11 (statement of Robert D’Amelio, Volunteer 
Advocate, Autism Speaks, Charlotte, NC).  
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If Christi and I can use a college savings account to provide for our 
[typically-abled] daughter Lindsey’s future, why can’t we use something 
similar to take care of Nicholas and Christopher [who have autism]? I would 
love to sleep at night knowing that I was doing everything I could to secure 
the future of my children.309 
Although the ABLE Act has alleviated this concern to some extent for 
families with disposable income, ABLE accounts cannot accept testamentary 
transfers in excess of the gift-tax exempt amount.310 As a result, the problem 
of family end-of-life planning remains unsolved under current law. 
B. Possible Objections to the Removal of Means Testing for Waiver 
Services 
There are two primary objections to providing broader access to waiver 
services. First, some may argue that providing broader access will result in 
redistribution toward the wealthy. Evidence suggests, however, that providing 
appropriate services would actually reduce government costs through reduced 
claims of non-disability-related services and through increased income tax 
revenue.311 Second, in a world of limited resources, increased spending on 
waiver services for individuals with disabilities may divert resources from 
other groups who would derive similar utility from those resources. Stated 
more colloquially, why should an individual with a disability whose assets 
place him among middle class or wealthy individuals have non-means-tested 
access to government-coordinated habilitative care when others do not? 
My claim in this paper is not that individuals with disabilities should have 
exclusive access to habilitative or vocational services or that their needs are 
more important than the needs of other government constituents. Rather, my 
claim is narrower. The needs of individuals with disabilities are different from 
the needs of other groups, and the distinctive characteristics of significant 
disability justify the provision of government-coordinated habilitative care, 
regardless of income or asset holding, in the absence of a robust and accessible 
market for privately coordinated habilitative care. Alternatively, distributive 
concerns could be addressed by an unrestricted form of Medicaid buy-in 
applicable to disability-related services. But denying access to government-
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coordinated habilitative care entirely on the basis of income, which is not an 
indicator of disability, makes no sense.312 
Horizontal, equity-based objections to non-means-tested waiver services 
are only valid to the extent that two claimants are similarly situated, and 
whether this is the case may depend upon the characteristics that one chooses 
to compare. The argument that an individual with a disability and a typically-
abled individual with equal asset holdings are similarly situated is a straw 
man. Income and asset ownership are not the only relevant comparators for 
purposes of assessing equity. To demonstrate how thoroughly the horizontal 
equity argument fails, consider two individuals whose situations—housing, 
employment, etc.—are identical in every way except that Individual A has 
autism. Would Individual B be indifferent to assuming the life of Individual 
A? Clearly not. Because our society is so thoroughly oriented toward the 
typically-abled, Individual B would be left worse off as a result of the trade, 
even if his income and asset holdings did not change because of it. In other 
words, A and B are not similarly situated after all. 
Furthermore, income and asset holdings are largely unmoored from an 
individual’s actual need for services. There is statistical support for the 
assertion that disability has a profound effect on individuals who live with it, 
regardless of socioeconomic status.313 Adults with intellectual or 
developmental disabilities are almost three and a half times more likely than 
those without such disabilities to need help or supervision with one or more 
activities of daily living, such as bathing, dressing, eating, using a toilet, and 
getting in and out of bed.314 In addition, “[a]fter controlling for gender, age, 
health status, race, and economic status, adults with disabilities were 
significantly less likely to be in the labor market than those without 
disabilities.”315 Nearly 40% of individuals with intellectual or developmental 
disabilities have functional limitations in language compared to 0.2% of 
people without them.316 Over 61% of individuals with intellectual or 
developmental disabilities have functional limitations with self-direction (i.e., 
are able to do daily activities without prompting) compared to 1% of people 
without them.317 And 88% of individuals with intellectual or developmental 
disabilities have functional limitations with regard to economic self-
sufficiency compared to 1.7% of people without them.318 Unlike their 
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2015] MAKING THE LAW MORE ABLE 1315 
typically-developed counterparts, individuals with significant disabilities may 
need adaptive tools such as wheelchairs, motorized scooters, home 
modifications for accessibility, picture communication software, and 
communication board devices.319 These needs present a unique set of 
challenges that present themselves across socioeconomic lines.320 As a result, 
a horizontal equity argument against non-means-tested provision of waiver 
services must fail: there simply is no similarly situated comparator. 
A second argument against non-means-tested provision of waiver 
services—that it will redistribute public resources to middleclass and wealthy 
families that do not need them—fails on pragmatic grounds for two reasons. 
First, comparable services are available on the private market only to people 
with substantial disposable income,321 and second, it is likely that most 
middle-class and wealthy families already have secured Medicaid eligibility 
for their loved one through financial planning and are accessing not only 
Medicaid but also other social safety net programs. For these families, reform 
does not increase access. Instead, it increases autonomy and may decrease 
overall government dependency. The following paragraphs address each point 
in turn. 
Unless an individual with a disability (or, more likely, that individual’s 
family) is very wealthy, there may be no reasonable private market corollary 
to government-coordinated waiver services in many parts of the county. There 
are at least two reasons why equivalent private services may be scarce. First, 
private care is not affordable to families of average means,322 and most private 
health insurance plans do not cover habilitative care.323 Second, waiver 
services may be coordinated by a case manager, which is typically not the case 
for care purchased on the private market. For an individual with an intellectual 
or developmental disability, coordination may be an important aspect of 
waiver services. A case manager assesses an individual’s needs, develops a 
plan for meeting those needs, coordinates care among multiple providers, links 
individuals with disabilities to other relevant federal and state programs, 
monitors the delivery of care and addresses problems with it, and responds to 
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crisis situations.324 For an individual with multiple care providers who address 
various aspects of daily living or employment, coordination by a third party 
expert may be essential to effective delivery of habilitative services. Notably, 
the needs for habilitative services and coordination of care do not decrease as a 
person’s income and asset holdings increase. As a result, it makes little sense 
to restrict access to government-coordinated habilitative care on the basis of 
income or asset holdings. 
Limiting government coordination and payment for waiver services to the 
very poor also cannot be justified on the basis that broader access will unduly 
burden taxpayers. First, access to government-coordinated habilitative care 
should be permissible as a matter of distributive justice, although as Ruth 
Colker has noted, this area is undertheorized.325 Second, the cost of offering 
waiver services to individuals who previously failed to meet the income and 
asset limitations may be offset by gains in other parts of the social safety net. 
Removal of means testing for waiver services would eliminate perverse 
incentives that cause family and friends of individuals with qualifying 
disabilities to withdraw support and that cause individuals with disabilities to 
refrain from full employment for fair pay.326 Providing broader access to 
waiver services in favor of individuals with significant disabilities may 
increase support from family and friends and may increase employment.327 
Increased support and employment may, in turn, reduce the number of 
claimants for nonwaiver benefits such as housing and food assistance. Finally, 
studies have indicated that increased employment-related services have the 
potential to both increase tax revenue and decrease healthcare costs.328 The 
interrelationship of these moving parts is complicated. Consequently, I do not 
argue without qualification that the removal of means testing would be cost 
neutral or cost saving. I do, however, take the position that it is not obviously 
cost increasing and that further study is warranted. 
Finally, arguments that focus on the injustice of redistribution in the form 
of waiver services to middle-class or wealthy individuals with disabilities 
assume that broader access will result in increased claims from the middleclass 
and wealthy. It is more likely, however, that given the importance of waiver 
services to quality of life, individuals with disabilities who have means (or 
whose families have means) are almost uniformly eligible for waiver services 
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as a result of trust planning or other financial planning.329 The issue for these 
families is not a lack of access, but rather the financial, emotional, and 
dignitary costs of that access. Finally, as mentioned above, broadening access 
to waiver services does not necessarily require costless provision of those 
services. The government could simultaneously ensure access and address 
redistributive concerns by permitting individuals with significant disabilities to 
buy into the Medicaid waiver regardless of their employment status. 
In summary, arguments against the removal of means testing on the basis 
of opposition to redistribution do not rest on solid ground in this context 
because the needs of individuals with disabilities are distinctive. In addition, it 
is not clear that the removal of means testing would result in a drain on 
resources. By reducing the demand for other social safety net support and 
increasing the potential for wage-earning work, elimination of means testing 
may even result in savings. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Medicaid eligibility is crucially important for people with qualifying 
disabilities because it provides nearly exclusive access to habilitative care that 
improves quality of life, facilitates independent living (if possible and desired), 
and preserves dignity. Means testing, through the imposition of income and 
asset limitations on eligibility, limits access to these necessary services. Means 
testing fails on normative grounds because it does not recognize the private 
market’s failure to provide affordable services and coordination among service 
providers. In addition, there is no relationship between an individual’s 
financial outlook and that individual’s need for coordinated habilitative care. 
As a result, placing income and asset holding limitations on the provision of 
care denies free and equal access to community living to individuals with 
significant disabilities who are too far above the federal poverty line to claim 
Medicaid and too far below the level of income or wealth needed to pay the 
market price for care. Means testing thus creates perverse incentives for 
individuals with disabilities to limit their hours of employment and their 
wages, which in turn, may limit their employability. The law also perversely 
incentivizes families and friends of individuals with disabilities to withdraw 
support, and in doing so, it interferes with natural relationships of dependency 
while simultaneously guaranteeing an increase in claims for other public 
benefits such as housing and food assistance. 
Attempts to alleviate the adverse impact of Medicaid eligibility rules on 
individuals with disabilities, such as the creation of special needs trusts, 
Medicaid buy-in programs, and ABLE accounts, are unquestionably 
improvements in access to integrated living, but they continue to restrict 
autonomy and impose their own dignitary, emotional, and financial costs. In 
                                                                                                                     
 329 Once again, it is worth noting that there has been no empirical research to support 
this assumption. 
1318 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:6 
addition, they are impartial solutions because they rely on private actors and 
funds for their implementation. A public solution is needed. Providing non-
means-tested access to government-coordinated habilitative care is a 
normatively superior solution. It recognizes the uniqueness of individuals with 
disabilities, allowing them and their families to autonomously create an 
appropriate and individually tailored financial support structure without 
jeopardizing access to care that is necessary for quality of life and integration 
into the broader community and workplace. 
